THE TREATISE ON
HUMAN NATURE

AND THAT ON
LIBERTY AND NECESSITY

WITH A SUPPLEMENT

BY THOMAS HOBBES.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS
BY THE EDITOR.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON AND CO. ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD,
BY J. M'CREEVY, BLACK-HORSE-COURT.

1812.
HUMAN NATURE

OR

THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS
OF POLICY

being a discovery
of the faculties acts and passions
of the soul of man
from their original causes

according to such philosophical principles
as are not commonly known or asserted.
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM,

EARL OF NEWCASTLE,

GOVERNOR TO THE PRINCE HIS HIGHNESS, ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

My most Honoured Lord,

FROM the principal parts of Nature, Reason and Passion, have proceeded two kinds of Learning, Mathematical and Dogmatical: the former is free from controversy and dispute, because it consisteth in comparing Figure and Motion only; in which things Truth and the Interest of Men oppose not each other: but in the other there is nothing undisputable, because it compareth Men, and meddleth with their right and profit; in which as oft as Reason is against a Man, so oft will a Man be against Reason. And from hence it cometh, that they who have written of Justice and Policy in general, do all invade each other and themselves with contradictions.

To reduce this doctrine to the rules and infallibility of Reason, there is no way but, first, to put such
principles down for a foundation, as Passion, not mistrusting, may not seek to displace; and afterwards to build thereon the truth of cases in the Law of Nature (which hitherto have been built in the air) by degrees, till the whole have been inexpugnable. Now, my Lord, the principles fit for such a foundation are those which heretofore I have acquainted your Lordship withal in private discourse, and which by your command I have here put into a method. To examine cases thereby between sovereign and sovereign, or between sovereign and subject, I leave to them that shall find leisure and encouragement thereto: for my part, I present this to your Lordship for the true and only foundation of such Science. For the style, it is therefore the worse, because, whilst I was writing, I consulted more with Logick than with Rhetorick: but for the doctrine, it is not slightly proved; and the conclusions thereof are of such nature, as, for want of them, Government and Peace have been nothing else, to this day, but mutual Fears: and it would be an incomparable benefit to Common-wealth, that every one held the opinion concerning Law and Policy here delivered.

The ambition therefore of this book, in seeking by your Lordship's countenance to insinuate itself with those whom the matter it containeth most nearly concerneth, is to be excused. For myself, I desire
no greater honour than I enjoy already in your Lordship's favour, unless it be that you would be pleased, in continuance thereof, to give me more exercise in your commands; which, as I am bound by your many great favours, I shall obey, being,

My most honoured Lord,

Your most humble,

And most obliged Servant,

THO. HOBBES.

May 9, 1640.
HUMAN NATURE:

OR THE

FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF POLICY.

CHAP. I.

1. The true and perspicuous explication of the Laws Natural and Politic (which is my present scope) dependeth upon the knowledge of what is Human Nature, what is Body Politic, and what it is we call a Law; concerning which points, as the writings of men from antiquity downwards have still increased, so also have the doubts and controversies concerning the same: and seeing that true Knowledge begetteth not Doubt nor Controversy, but Knowledge; it is manifest from the present controversies, that they which have hitherto written thereof, have not well understood their own subject.

2. Harm I can do none, though I err no less than they; for I leave men but as they are; in doubt and dispute: but, intending not to take any principle
upon trust, but only to put men in mind of what they know already, or may know by their own experience, I hope to err the less; and when I do, it must proceed from too hasty concluding, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.

3. On the other side, if Reasoning aright win not consent, which may very easily happen, from them that being confident of their own knowledge weigh not what is said, the fault is not mine but theirs; for as it is my part to shew my reasons, so it is theirs to bring attention.

4. Man's Nature is the sum of his natural faculties and powers, as the faculties of Nutrition, Motion, Generation, Sense, Reason, &c. These Powers we do unanimously call Natural, and are contained in the definition of Man, under these words, Animal and Rational.

5. According to the two principal parts of Man, I divide his faculties into two sorts, Faculties of the Body, and Faculties of the Mind.

6. Since the minute and distinct anatomy of the powers of the Body is nothing necessary to the present purpose, I will only sum them up in these three heads, Power Nutritive, Power Motive, and Power Generative.

7. Of the Powers of the Mind there be two sorts, Cognitive, Imaginative, or Conceptive—and Motive; and first of Cognitive.
For the understanding of what I mean by the Power Cognitive, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain Images or Conceptions of the Things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the Image thereof, and all those Things which he had before seen or perceived in it; every one by his own experience knowing, that the absence or destruction of Things once imagined doth not cause the absence or destruction of the Imagination itself. This Imagery and Representations of the qualities of the things without, is that we call our Conception, Imagination, Ideas, Notice or Knowledge of them; and the Faculty or Power by which we are capable of such Knowledge, is that I here call Cognitive Power, or Conceptive,—the Power of knowing or conceiving.
CHAP. II.

1. **HAVING** declared what I mean by the word Conception, and other words equivalent thereunto, I come to the Conceptions themselves; to shew their differences, their causes, and the manner of their production, so far as is necessary for this place.

2. Originally all Conceptions proceed from the action of the Thing itself, whereof it is the Conception: now when the Action is present, the Conception it produceth is also called Sense; and the Thing by whose Action the same is produced, is called the Object of the Sense.

3. By our several Organs we have several conceptions of several qualities in the Objects; for by Sight we have a conception or image composed of colour and figure, which is all the notice and know-
HUMAN NATURE.

ledge, the object imparteth to us of its nature by the Eye. By Hearing we have a conception called sound, which is all the knowledge we have of the quality of the Object from the Ear. And so the rest of the Senses are also conceptions of several Qualities or Natures of their Objects.

4. Because the Image in Vision, consisting of colour and shape; is the Knowledge we have of the qualities of the object of that Sense; it is no hard matter for a man to fall into this opinion, that the same colour and shape are the very Qualities themselves; and for the same cause, that sound and noise are the Qualities of the Bell or of the Air. And this Opinion hath been so long received, that the contrary must needs appear as a great paradox; and yet the introduction of Species visible and intelligible (which is necessary for the maintenance of that opinion) passing to and fro from the Object, is worse than any paradox, as being a plain impossibility. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these points:

That the Subject wherein colour and image are inherent, is not the Object or thing seen.
That there is nothing without us (really) which we call an Image or Colour.
That the said Image or Colour is but an appari-tion unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration, which the Object worketh in the brain,
or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.
That as in Vision, so also in conceptions that arise from the other Senses, the Subject of their Inherence is not the Object, but the Sentient.

5. Every man hath so much experience as to have seen the Sun and the other visible objects by reflection in the water and glasses; and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion, that colour and image may be there where the Thing seen is not. But because it may be said, that notwithstanding the Image in the water be not in the Object, but a thing merely phantastical, yet there may be Colour really in the Thing itself: I will urge further this experience, that divers times men see directly the same Object double, as two Candles for one; which may happen from distemper, or otherwise, without distemper, if a man will; the Organs being either in their right temper or equally distempered, the colours and figures in two such Images of the same Thing cannot be inherent therein, because the Thing seen cannot be in two places.

One of these Images therefore is not inherent in the Object; but seeing the Organs of the Sight are then in equal temper or distemper, the one of them is no more inherent than the other; and consequently neither of them both is in the Object; which is
the first proposition mentioned in the precedent number.

6. Secondly, that the Image of any thing by reflection in a glass of water or the like, is not any thing in or behind the glass, or in or under the water, every man may grant to himself; which is the second proposition.

7. For the third, we are to consider, First, that upon every great agitation or concussion of the Brain (as happeneth from a stroke, especially if the stroke be upon the Eye) whereby the Optic Nerve suffereth any great violence, there appeareth before the eyes a certain light, which light is nothing without, but an Apparition only; all that is real being the Concussion or Motion of the parts of that Nerve; from which experience we may conclude, that Apparition of Light is really nothing but Motion within. If therefore from lucid bodies there can be derived Motion, so as to affect the Optic Nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an Image of Light somewhere in that line by which the motion was last derived to the Eye; that is to say, in the Object, if we look directly on it, and in the Glass or Water, when we look upon it in the Line of Reflection; which in effect is the third proposition; namely, that Image and Colour is but an Apparition to us of that motion, agitation, or alteration, which
the Object worketh in the Brain or Spirits, or some internal substance in the Head.

8. But that from all lucid, shining and illuminate bodies there is a Motion produced to the eye, and through the eye to the Optic Nerve, and so into the Brain, by which that Apparition of Light or Colour is effected, is not hard to prove. And first, it is evident that that Fire, the only lucid body here upon earth, worketh by Motion equally every way; insomuch as the Motion thereof stopped or inclosed, it is presently extinguished, and no more Fire: and further, that that Motion whereby the Fire worketh, is dilation and contraction of itself alternately, commonly called Scintillation or Glowing, is manifest also by experience. From such Motion in the Fire must needs arise a rejection or casting from itself of that part of the Medium which is contiguous to it, whereby that part also rejecteth the next, and so successively one part beateth back another to the very Eye; and in the same manner the exterior part of the Eye presseth the interior, (the Laws of Refraction still observed.) Now the interior coat of the Eye is nothing else but a piece of the Optic Nerve; and therefore the motion is still continued thereby into the Brain; and by resistance or re-action of the brain, is also a Rebound into the Optic Nerve again; which we not conceiving as Motion or Rebound from
within, do think it is without, and call it Light; as hath been already shewed by the experience of a stroke. We have no reason to doubt that the fountain of light, the Sun, worketh by any other ways than the Fire, at least in this matter. And thus all Vision hath its original from such motion as is here described: for where there is no Light, there is no Sight; and therefore Colour also must be the same thing with Light, as being the effect of its lucid bodies: their difference being only this, that when the Light cometh directly from the fountain of the eye, or indirectly by reflection from clean and polite bodies, and such as have not any particular motion internal to alter it, we call it Light; but when it cometh to the Eye by reflection from uneven, rough, and coarse bodies, (or such as are affected with internal motion of their own that may alter it) then we call it Colour; Colour and Light differing only in this, that the one is pure, and the other perturbed Light. By that which hath been said, not only the truth of the third proposition, but also the whole manner of producing Light and Colour, is apparent.

9. As Colour is not inherent in the object, but an Effect thereof upon us, caused by such motion in the object, as hath been described; so neither is Sound in the thing we hear, but in ourselves. One manifest sign thereof is, that as a man may see, so also he may hear double or treble, by multiplication
of Echoes, which echoes are sounds as well as the original; and not being in one and the same place, cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them. Nothing can make any thing which is not in itself: the Clapper hath no sound in it, but motion; and maketh motion in the internal parts of the Bell: so the Bell hath motion and not sound, that imparteth motion to the Air; and the Air hath motion, but not sound: the Air imparteth motion by the ear and nerve unto the Brain; and the Brain hath motion, but not sound: from the Brain it reboundeth back into the Nerves outward, and thence it becometh an Apparition without, which we call Sound. And to proceed to the seat of the Senses, it is apparent enough that the Smell and Taste of the same Thing are not the same to every man; and therefore are not in the Thing smelt or tasted, but in the Men. So likewise the Heat we feel from the fire is manifestly in us, and is quite different from the Heat which is in the Fire: for our heat is Pleasure or Pain, according as it is great or moderate; but in the Coal there is no such thing. By this the fourth and last proposition is proved, viz. That as in Vision, so also in Conceptions that arise from other Senses, the Subject of their Inherence is not in the Object, but in the Sentient.

10. And from hence also it followeth, that whatsoever Accidents or Qualities our Senses make us
think there be in the World, they be not there, but are Seeming and Apparitions only: the Things that really are in the World without us, are those Motions by which these Seemings are caused. And this is the great Deception of Sense, which also is to be by Sense corrected: for as Sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the Colour seemeth to be in the Object; so also Sense telleth me, when I see by Reflection, that Colour is not in the Object.
CHAP. III.

1. Imagination defined.
2. Sleep and Dreams defined.
4. Fiction defined.
5. Phantasms defined.
6. Remembrance defined.
7. Wherein Remembrance consisteth.
8. Why in a Dream a Man never thinks he dreams.
10. That a Dream may be taken for Reality and Vision.

1. As standing water, put into motion by the stroke of a stone, or blast of wind, doth not presently give over moving as soon as the wind ceaseth, or the stone settleth; so neither doth the Effect cease which the object hath wrought upon the Brain, so soon as ever by turning aside of the Organs the object ceaseth to work; that is to say, though the Sense be past, the Image or Conception remaineth; but more obscure while we are awake, because some object or other continually plieth and soliciteth our eyes and ears, keeping the mind in a stronger motion, whereby
the weaker doth not easily appear. And this obscure
Conception is that we call *Phantasy* or *Imagination*;
*Imagination* being (to define it) *Conception* remaining,
and by little and little decaying from and after the
act of Sense.

2. But when present Sense is not, as in Sleep,
there the Images remaining after Sense (when there
be many) as in Dreams, are not obscure; but strong
and clear, as in Sense itself. The reason is, that
which obscured and made the conceptions weak,
namely Sense, and present Operation of the object,
is removed: for *Sleep is the Privation of the Act
of Sense* (the Power remaining); and *Dreams are
the Imagination* of them that sleep.

3. The *Causes of Dreams* (if they be natural) are
the actions or violence of the inward parts of a man
upon his Brain; by which the passages of Sense, by
Sleep, numbed, are restored to their motion. The
signs by which this appeareth to be so, are the dif-
ferences of dreams (old men commonly dream oftener,
and have their dreams more painful than young) pro-
ceeding from the different accidents of man's body;
as dreams of Lust, as dreams of Anger, according as
the Heart, or other parts within, work more or less
upon the Brain, by more or less Heat; so also the
descent of different sorts of spirit maketh us
dream of different tastes of meats and drinks; and I
believe there is a reciprocation of motion from the
brain to the vital parts, and back from the vital parts to the brain; whereby not only Imagination begetteth Motion in those parts, but also Motion in those parts begetteth Imagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true, and that sad Imaginations nourish the Spleen, then we see also a cause why a strong Spleen reciprocally causeth fearful Dreams, and why the effects of Lasciviousness may in a dream produce the image of some person that had caused them. Another sign that dreams are caused by the action of the inward parts, is the disorder and casual consequence of one conception or image to another: for when we are waking, the Antecedent thought or conception introduceth and is cause of the Consequent, (as the water followeth a man's dry finger upon a dry and level table); but in Dreams there is commonly no Coherence (and when there is, it is by chance) which must needs proceed from this, that the Brain in dreams is not restored to its motion in every part alike; whereby it cometh to pass, that our Thoughts appear like the stars between the flying clouds, not in the order which a man would chuse to observe them, but as the uncertain flight of broken clouds permits.

4. As when the Water, or any liquid thing moved at once by divers moves, receiveth one motion compounded of them all; so also the Brain, or Spirit therein, having been stirred by divers objects,
composeth an Imagination of divers conceptions that appeared single to the Sense. As for example, the Sense sheweth at one time the figure of a mountain, and at another time the colour of gold; but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a golden mountain. From the same cause it is, there appear unto us Castles in the Air, Chimerae, and other Monsters which are not in Rarum Nature, but have been conceived by the Sense in pieces at several times. And this Composition is that which we commonly call Fiction of the Mind.

5. There is yet another kind of Imagination, which for clearness contends with Sense, as well as a Dream; and that is, when the Action of Sense hath been long or vehement; and the experience thereof is more frequent in the sense of Seeing, than the rest. An example whereof is, the Image remaining before the eye after looking upon the Sun: also, those little Images that appear before the eyes in the dark, whereof I think every man hath experience, (but they most of all who are timorous or superstitious) are examples of the same. And these, for distinction's sake, may be called Phantasma.

6. By the Senses, which are numbered according to the Organs to be five, we take notice, (as hath been said already) of the objects without us; and that notice is our conception thereof: but we take Notice also, some way or other, of our Conception; for
when the Conception of the same thing cometh again, we take notice that it is again; that is to say, that we have had the same conception before; which is as much as to imagine a thing past; which is impossible to the Sense; which is only of things present. This therefore may be accounted a sixth Sense, but internal; (not external, as the rest) and is commonly called Remembrance.

7. For the Manner by which we take notice of a Conception past, we are to remember, that in the definition of Imagination, it is said to be a Conception by little and little decaying; or growing more obscure. An Obscure Conception is that which representeth the whole object together, but none of the smaller parts by themselves; and as more or fewer parts be represented, so is the Conception or Representation said to be more or less clear. Seeing then the Conception, which when it was first produced by Sense, was clear, and represented the parts of the object distinctly; and when it cometh again is obscure, we find missing somewhat that we expected; by which we judge it past and decayed. For example, a man that is present in a foreign city, seeth not only whole streets, but also can distinguish particular houses and parts of houses; but departed thence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his mind as he did, some house or turning escaping him; yet is this to remember: when afterwards there
escape him more particulars, this is also to remember, but not so well. In process of time, the Image of the city returneth but as a mass of building only, which is almost to have forgotten it. Seeing then Remembrance is more or less, as we find more or less Obscurity, why may not we well think Remembrance to be nothing else but the missing of parts which every man expecteth should succeed, after they have a conception of the whole? To see at a great distance of place, and to remember at a great distance of time, is to have like Conceptions of the thing: for there wanteth distinction of parts in both; the one Conception being weak by operation at Distance, the other by Decay.

8. And from this that hath been said there followeth that a man can never know he dreameth; he may dream he doubteth whether it be a Dream or no: but the clearness of the Imagination representeth every thing with as many parts as doth Sense itself; and consequently, he can take notice of nothing but as present; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his Conceptions, that is to say Dreams, obscurer than they were in the Sense: so that he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as Sense; which is impossible.

9. From the same ground it proceedeth, that men wonder not in their dreams at places and persons, as they would do waking: for waking, a man would
think it strange to be in a place where he never was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a Dream, there cometh little of that kind into consideration. The Clearness of conception in a Dream taketh away Distrust, unless the Strange-ness be excessive, as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt, and then most commonly he waketh.

10. Nor is it impossible for a man to be so far deceived, as when his Dream is past, to think it real: for if he dream of such things as are ordinarily in his mind, and in such order as he useth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the place where he findeth himself when he waketh, (all which may happen,) I know no Kēr or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not; and therefore do the less wonder to hear a man sometimes tell his Dream for a Truth, or take it for a Vision.
CHAP. IV.

1. Discourse.
2. The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts.
3. Ranging.
4. Sagacity.
5. Reminiscence.
7. Expectation.
8. Conjecture.
11. Caveats of concluding from Experience.

1. The Succession of conceptions in the mind, Series or Consequence of one after another, may be casual and incoherent, as in Dreams for the most part; and it may be orderly, as when the former thought introduceth the latter; and this is Discourse of the Mind. But because the word Discourse is commonly taken for the coherence and consequence of Words, I will, to avoid equivocation, call it Discussion.

2. The cause of the Coherence or Consequence of one conception to another, is their first coherence or consequence at that time when they are produced.
by Sense: as for example, from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a Stone, from the same cause; from Stone to Foundation, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from Foundation to Church, and from Church to People, and from People to Tumult: and according to this example, the mind may run almost from any thing to any thing. But as in the Sense the conception of Cause and Effect may succeed one another; so may they after Sense in the Imagination: and for the most part they do so; the Cause whereof is the appetite of them, who having a conception of the End, have next unto it a conception of the next Means to that End: as, when a Man, from a thought of Honour to which he hath an appetite, cometh to the thought of Wisdom, which is the next means thereunto; and from thence to the thought of Study, which is the next means to Wisdom.

3. To omit that kind of Discursion by which we proceed from any thing to any thing, there are of the other kind divers Sorts: as first, in the Senses there are certain coherences of conceptions, which we may call Ranging: examples whereof are; a man casteth his eye upon the ground, to look about him for some small thing lost; the hounds casting about at a fault in hunting; and the Ranging of spaniels: and herein we take a beginning arbitrary.
4. Another sort of Discursion is, when the Appetite giveth a man his beginning; as in the example before, where Honour, to which a man hath appetite, maketh him think upon the next means of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. And this the Latins call Sagacetas, and we may call Hunting or Tracing; as dogs trace beasts by the smell, and men hunt them by their footsteps; or as men hunt after riches, place, or knowledge.

5. There is yet another kind of Discursion beginning with the appetite to recover something lost, proceeding from the present backward; from thought of the place where we miss at, to the thought of the place from whence we came last; and from the thought of that, to the thought of a place before; till we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is called Reminiscence.

6. The Remembrance of Succession of one thing to another, that is, of what was antecedent, and what consequent, and what concomitant, is called an Experiment; whether the same be made by us voluntarily, as when a man putteth any thing into the fire, to see what effect the fire will produce upon it; or not made by us, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have had many Experiments, is that we call Experience, which is
nothing else but Remembrance of what Antecedents have been followed by what Consequents.

7. No man can have in his mind a Conception of the future; for the future is not yet: but of our conceptions of the past, we make a future; or rather, call Past future relatively. Thus after a man hath been accustomed to see like Antecedents followed by like Consequents, whenever he seeth the like come to pass to any thing he had seen before; he looks there should follow it the same that followed then: as for example, because a man hath often seen Offences followed by Punishment, when he seeth an Offence in present, he thinketh Punishment to be consequent thereto; but consequent unto that which is present men call Future: And thus we make Remembrance to be the Prevision of things to come, or Expectation or Presumption of the Future.

8. In the same manner, if a man seeth in present that which he hath seen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he saw before, is also antecedent to that he presently seeth: as for example, he that hath seen the Ashes remain after the Fire, and now again seeth Ashes, concludeth again there hath been Fire: and this is called again Conjecture of the past, or Presumption of the Fact.

9. When a man hath so often observed like Antecedents to be followed by like Consequents, that when-
soever he seeth the Antecedent, he looketh again for the Consequent; or when he seeth the Consequent, maketh account there hath been the like Antecedent; then he calleth both the Antecedent and the Consequent Signs one of another; as Clouds are signs of Rain to come, and Rain of Clouds past.

10. This taking of signs by Experience, is that wherein men do ordinarily think the difference stands between man and man in Wisdom; by which they commonly understand a man's whole Ability or Power cognitive; but this is an error: for the signs are but conjectural; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so their Assurance is more or less; but never full and evident: for though a man have always seen the Day and Night to follow one another hitherto, yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally: Experience concludeth nothing universally. If the Signs hit twenty times for one missing, a man may lay a wager of Twenty to One of the Event; but may not conclude it for a Truth. But by this it is plain, that they shall conjecture best, that have most Experience, because they have most Signs to conjecture by; which is the reason old men are more prudent, that is, conjecture better, ceteris paribus, than young: for, being old, they remember more; and Experience is but Remembrance: and men of quick Imagination, ceteris paribus, are more prudent than
those whose Imaginations are slow; for they observe more in less Time. Prudence is nothing but Conjecture from Experience, or taking of Signs from Experience warily; that is, that the Experiments from which he taketh such Signs be all remembered; for else the Cases are not alike that seem so.

11. As in Conjecture concerning things past and future, it is Prudence to conclude from Experience what is like to come to pass, or to have passed already; so it is an error to conclude from it, that it is so or so called; that is to say, we cannot from Experience conclude that any thing is to be called just or unjust, true or false, or any Proposition universal whatsoever, except it be from Remembrance of the Use of Names imposed arbitrarily by men: for example, to have heard a Sentence given in the like Case, the like Sentence a thousand times, is not enough to conclude that the sentence is just; though most men have no other means to conclude by: but it is necessary, for the drawing of such conclusion, to trace and find out, by many Experiences, what men do mean by calling things just and unjust. Further, there is another caveat to be taken in concluding by Experience, from the tenth section of the second chapter; that is, that we conclude not such things to be without, that are within us.
CHAP. V.

1. Of Marks.
2. Names or Appellations.
3. Names positive and privative.
4. Advantage of Names maketh us capable of Science.
5. Names universal and singular.
6. Universals not in Rerum Natura.
7. Equivocal Names.
8. Understanding.
11. Ratiocination.

1. SEEING the Succession of conceptions in the mind is caused, as hath been said before, by the succession they had one to another when they were produced by the Senses, and that there is no conception that hath not been produced immediately before or after innumerable others, by the innumerable acts of
Sense; it must needs follow, that one Conception followeth not another according to our Election and the need we have of them, but as it chanceth us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind. The experience we have hereof is in such brute beasts, which having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they hid it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but man, who in this point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this defect; and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible mark, the which, when he seeth it again, may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. A *Mark* therefore is a sensible object which a man erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the end to remember thereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his sense again: as men that have past by a rock at sea, set up some mark, thereby to remember their former danger, and avoid it.

2. In the number of these marks are those *human voices*, which we call the Names or Appellations of things sensible by the ear; by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to which we gave those names or appellations; as the appellation *White* bringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as produce that colour or conception in us.
A Name or Appellation therefore is the voice of a man arbitrary, imposed for a Mark to bring into his mind some conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.

3. Things named are either the objects themselves, as a Man; or the conception itself that we have of man, as Shape and Motion; or some privation, which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive not in him; as when we conceive he is not just, not finite, we give him the name of Unjust, of Infinite, which signify Privation or Defect; and to the Privations themselves we give the names of Injustice and Infiniteness: so that here be two sorts of Names; one of Things, in which we conceive something; or of the Conceptions themselves, which are called positive: the other of Things wherein we conceive Privation or Defect, and those names are called privative.

4. By the advantage of Names it is that we are capable of Science; which beasts, for want of them, are not; nor man, without the use of them: for, as a beast misseth not one or two out of many her young ones, for want of those names of order, One, Two and Three, and which we call Number; so neither would a man, without repeating orally or mentally the words of Number, know how many pieces of money or other things lie before him.

5. Seeing there be many conceptions of one and
the same thing, and for every conception we give it a several name; it followeth that for one and the same thing we have many names or attributes; as to the same man we give the appellations of Just, Valiant, &c. for divers virtues; of Strong, Comely, &c. for divers qualities of the body. And again, because from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same appellation: as to all things we see, we give the same name of Visible; and to all things we see moveable, we give the appellation of Moveable: and those names we give to many, are called universal to them all; as the name of Man to every particular of mankind: such appellation as we give to one only thing, we call individual, or singular; as Socrates, and other proper names; or, by circumlocution, he that writ the Iliads, for Homer.

6. The universality of one Name to many things hath been the cause that men think the things are themselves universal; and so seriously contend that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the Men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call Man, viz. Man in general; deceiving themselves, by taking the universal or general Appellation for the Thing it signifieth.—For if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a Man, which is as much as to say of a man in general, he meaneth no more but that the
painter should chuse what Man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be; none of which are universal: but when he would have him to draw the picture of the King, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one Person he chuseth. It is plain therefore, that there is nothing universal but Names; which are therefore called indefinite; because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a singular Name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth; as when we say, This Man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper Name, or by some such other way.

7. The appellations that be universal, and common to many things, are not always given to all the Particulars (as they ought to be) for like conceptions and like considerations in them all; which is the cause that many of them are not of constant signification, but bring into our mind other thoughts than those for which they were ordained, and these are called equivocal. As for example, the word Faith signifies the same with Belief; sometimes it signifieth particularly that Belief which maketh a Christian; and sometimes it signifieth the keeping of a Promise. Also all Metaphors are by profession Equivocal: and there is scarce any word that is not made equivocal by divers
contextures of speech, or by diversity of pronunciation and gesture.

8. This Equivocation of Names maketh it difficult to recover those conceptions for which the Name was ordained; and that not only in the language of other men, wherein we are to consider the drift and occasion and contexture of the speech, as well as the words themselves; but also in our own discourse, which being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto us not our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from Equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said: and this is it we call Understanding.

9. Of two Appellations, by the help of this little verb is, or something equivalent, we make an Affirmation or Negation, either of which in the schools we call also a Proposition, which consisteth of two Appellations joined together by the said verb is: as for example—Man is a living creature—or thus, Man is not righteous:—whereof the former is called an Affirmation, because the appellation Living Creature is positive; the latter a Negative, because Not Righteous is privative.

10. In every Proposition, be it affirmative or negative, the latter appellation either comprehendeth
the former; as in this proposition, Charity is Virtue; the name of Virtue comprehendeth the name of Charity and many other virtues beside; and then is the proposition said to be true, or Truth; for Truth and a True Proposition is all one: or else the latter appellation comprehendeth not the former; as in this proposition, Every Man is just; the name of Just comprehendeth not every man; for Unjust is the name of the far greater part of men; and the proposition is said to be false, or Falsity; Falsity and a False Proposition being also the same thing.

11. In what manner of two propositions, whether both affirmative, or one affirmative, the other negative, is made a Syllogism, I forbear to write. All this that hath been said of Names or Propositions, though necessary, is but dry discourse: and this place is not for the whole Art of Logick, which if I enter further into, I ought to pursue: besides, it is not needful; for there be few men which have not so much natural logick, as thereby to discern well enough whether any conclusion I shall make in this discourse hereafter be well or ill collected: only thus much I say in this place, that making of Syllogisms is that we call Ratiocination or Reasoning.

12. Now when a man reasoneth from Principles that are found indubitable by experience, all decep-
tions of sense and equivocation of words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right Reason: but when from his conclusion a man may, by good Ratiocination, derive that which is contradictory to any evident truth whatsoever, then he is said to have concluded against Reason; and such a conclusion is called Absurdity.

13. As the Invention of Names hath been necessary for the drawing men out of Ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the necessary coherence of one conception to another; so also hath it on the other side precipitated men into error: insomuch, that whereas by the benefit of words and ratiocination they exceed brute beasts in knowledge, and the commodities that accompany the same, so they exceed them also in error: for, true and false are Things not incident to beasts, because they adhere not to Propositions and Language; nor have they Ratiocination, whereby to multiply one untruth by another, as men have.

14. It is the nature almost of every corporal thing, being often moved in one and the same manner, to receive continually a greater and greater easiness and aptitude to the same motion; insomuch as in time the same becometh so habitual, that to beget it there needs no more than to begin it. The Passions of man, as they are the beginning of voluntary motions,
so are they the beginning of Speech, which is the motion of the tongue. And men desiring to shew others the knowledge, opinions, conceptions and passions which are in themselves, and to that end having invented Language, have by that means transferred all that discursiveness of their mind mentioned in the former chapter, by the motion of their tongues, into Discourse of Words: and Ratio now is but Oratio, for the most part; wherein Custom hath so great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word; the rest follow habitually, and are not followed by the mind; as it is with beggars, when they say their Pater noster, putting together such words, and in such manner, as in their education they have learned from their nurses, from their companies, or from their teachers, having no images or conceptions in their mind, answering to the words they speak: and as they have learned themselves, so they teach posterity. Now if we consider the power of those deceptions of the sense, mentioned Chap. II. Sect. 10. and also how unconstantly Names have been settled, and how subject they are to Equivocation, and how diversified by Passion, (scarce two men agreeing what is to be called Good, and what Evil; what Liberality, what Prodigality; what Valour, what Temerity) and how subject men are to paralogism, or fallacy in reasoning, I may in a manner conclude that it is impossible to
rectify so many errors of any one man, as must needs proceed from those causes, without beginning a-new from the very first grounds of all our knowledge and sense; and instead of Books, reading over orderly one's own Conceptions: in which meaning, I take Nosce teipsum for a precept worthy the reputation it hath gotten.
CHAP. VI.

1. Of the two Kinds of Knowledge.
2. Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge.
3. Evidence defined.
4. Science defined.
5. Supposition defined.
6. Opinion defined.
7. Belief defined.
8. Conscience defined.
9. Belief, in some Cases, no less from Doubt than Knowledge.

1. THERE is a story somewhere, of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of blindness (wherewith he was born) by St. Albane, or other saints, at the town of St. Albans; and that the duke of Glocester being there, to be satisfied of the truth of the miracle, asked the man, what colour is this; who, by answering it was green, discovered himself, and was punished for a counterfeit: for though by his sight newly received, he might distinguish between Green, and Red, and all other colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first sight which of them was called Green, or Red, or by any other name. By this we may un-
understand, there be two kinds of knowledge, whereof the one is nothing else but Sense, or Knowledge original, as I have said in the beginning of the second chapter, and Remembrance of the same; the other is called Science or Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions, and how things are called; and is derived from Understanding. Both of these sorts are but Experience; the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us from without; and the latter Experience men have from the proper use of Names in language: and all Experience being, as I have said, but Remembrance, all Knowledge is Remembrance: and of the former the Register we keep in books is called History; but the Registers of the latter are called the Sciences.

2. There are two things necessarily implied in this word Knowledge; the one is Truth, the other Evidence: for what is not Truth can never be known. For, let a man say he knoweth a thing never so well, if the same shall afterwards appear false, he is driven to confession that it was not Knowledge, but Opinion. Likewise, if the Truth be not evident, though a man holdeth it, yet is his Knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary: for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge, all Truth were known; which is not so.

3. What Truth is, hath been defined in the precedent chapter; what Evidence is, I now set down:
and it is the concomitance of a man's Conception with the Words that signify such conception in the act of ratiocination: for when a man reasoneth with his lips only, to which the mind suggesteth only the beginning, and followeth not the words of his mouth with the conceptions of his mind, out of custom of so speaking; though he begin his ratiocination with true Propositions, and proceed with certain Syllogisms, and thereby make always true conclusions; yet are not his conclusions evident to him, for want of the concomitance of conception with his words: for if the Words alone were sufficient, a Parrot might be taught as well to know Truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to Truth as the Sap to the Tree; which, so far as it creepeth along with the body and branches, keepeth them alive; where it forsaketh them, they die: for this Evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the Life of Truth.

4. Knowledge therefore which we call Science, I define to be Evidence of Truth, from some beginning or principle of Sense: for the truth of a proposition is never evident, until we conceive the meaning of the words or terms whereof it consisteth; which are always conceptions of the mind; nor can we remember those Conceptions, without the Thing that produced the same by our Senses. The first Principle of Knowledge is, that we have such and such Conceptions; the second, that we have thus and thus
named the Things whereof they are conceptions; the third is, that we have joined those names in such manner, as to make true Propositions; the fourth and last is, that we have joined those propositions in such manner as they be concluding, and the Truth of the Conclusion said to be known. And of these two kinds of Knowledge, (whereof the former is Experience of Fact, and the latter Evidence of Truth,) as the former, if it be great, is called Prudence; so the latter, if it be much, hath usually been called, both by ancient and modern writers, Sapience or Wisdom: and of this latter, Man only is capable; of the former, brute Beasts also participate.

5. A Proposition is said to be supposed, when, being not evident, it is nevertheless admitted for a time, to the end that, joining to it other propositions, we may conclude something; and proceed from conclusion to conclusion, for a trial whether the same will lead us into any absurd or impossible conclusion; which if it do, then we know such Supposition to have been false.

6. But if, running through many conclusions, we come to none that are absurd, then we think the Proposition probable: likewise we think probable whatsoever Proposition we admit for Truth by error of reasoning, or from trusting to other men: and all such propositions as are admitted by Trust or Error,
we are not said to know, but to think them to be true; and the admittance of them is called Opinion.

7. And particularly, when the Opinion is admitted out of Trust to other men, they are said to believe it; and their admittance of it is called Belief, and sometimes Faith.

8. It is either Science or Opinion which we commonly mean by the word Conscience; for men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their conscience; which they never do, when they think it doubtful; and therefore they know, or think they know it to be true. But men, when they say things upon their conscience, are not therefore presumed certainly to know the truth of what they say; it remaineth then that that word is used by them that have an opinion, not only of the Truth of the thing, but also of their Knowledge of it; to which the Truth of the Proposition is consequent. Conscience I therefore define to be Opinion of Evidence.

9. Belief, which is the admitting of propositions upon Trust, in many cases is no less free from doubt than perfect and manifest Knowledge: for as there is nothing whereof there is not some cause; so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now there be many things which we receive from Report of others, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of Doubt: for what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can
know, and have no cause to report otherwise than they are, (such as is great part of our Histories) unless a man would say that all the world had conspired to deceive him?

And thus much of Sense, Imagination, Discursion, Ratiocination, and Knowledge; which are the acts of our Power cognitive, or conceptive. That Power of the mind which we call motive, differeth from the Power motive of the body: for the power motive of the body is that by which it moveth other bodies, and which we call Strength; but the Power motive of the Mind, is that by which the mind giveth animal motion to the Body wherein it existeth: the acts hereof are our Affections and Passions, of which I am to speak in general,
CHAP. VII.

4. End, Fruition.
5. Profitable, Use, Vain.
6. Felicity.
7. Good and Evil mixt.
8. Sensual Delight, and Pain; Joy and Grief.

In the eighth section of the second chapter is shewed, that Conceptions and Apparitions are nothing really but Motion in some internal substance of the head; which motion not stopping there, but proceeding to the Heart, of necessity must there either help or hinder the motion which is called Vital: when it helpeth, it is called Delight, Contentment, or Pleasure, which is nothing really but Motion about the Heart, as Conception is nothing but Motion in the Head; and the objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful, or by some name equivalent. The Latins have Jucundum, à juvando, from helping; and the same Delight, with reference to the object, is called Love: but when such motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital motion, then it is called Pain;
and in relation to that which causeth it, Hatred; which the Latins express sometimes by Odium, and sometimes by Tedium.

2. This motion in which consisteth Pleasure or Pain, is also a solicitation or provocation either to draw near to the thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth; and this Solicitation is the endeavour or internal beginning of animal motion; which, when the object delighteth, is called Appetite; when it displeaseth, it is called Aversion, in respect of the displeasure present; but in respect of the displeasure expected, Fear. So that Pleasure, Love, and Appetite, which is also called Desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing.

3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, Good; and that Evil which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from other in constitution, they differ also from one another concerning the common distinction of Good and Evil. Nor is there any such thing as absolute Goodness, considered without Relation: for even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty is his Goodness to us. And as we call Good and Evil the things that please and displease, so we call Goodness and Badness the Qualities or Powers whereby they do it: and the Signs of that Goodness are called by the Latins in one word Pulchritudo,
and the Sign of Evil, *Turpitude*; to which we have no words precisely answerable.

As all Conceptions we have immediately by the Sense, are *Delight*, or *Pain*, or *Appetite*, or *Fear*; so are all the Imaginations after Sense. But as they are weaker Imaginations, so are they also weaker Pleasures, or weaker Pain.

4. As *Appetite* is the beginning of animal motion towards something that pleaseth us, so is the attaining thereof the End of that Motion; which we also call the Scope, and Aim; and final Cause of the same: and when we attain that End, the delight we have thereby is called the *Fruition*: So that *Bonum* and *Finis* are different Names, but for different considerations of the same thing.

5. And of *Ends*, some of them are called *propinquus*, that is, near at hand; others *remotus*, far off: but when the Ends that are nearer attaining, be compared with those that be farther off, they are called not Ends, but *Means*, and the *Way* to those. But for an *utmost end*, in which the ancient Philosophers have placed *Felicity*, and disputed much concerning the way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, more than to *Utopia*: for while we live we have *Desires*, and Desire presupposeth a further End. Those things which please us, as the way or means to a further end, we call *profitable*; and
the Fruition of them, Use; and those things that profit not, vain.

6. Seeing all Delight is Appetite, and presupposeth a further End, there can be no contentment but in proceeding: and therefore we are not to marvel, when we see that as men attain to more riches, honour, or other power, so their Appetite continually groweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmost degree of some kind of Power, they pursue some other, as long as in any kind they think themselves behind any other: of those therefore that have attained to the highest degree of Honour and Riches, some have affected mastery in some Art; as Nero in Music and Poetry, Commodus in the art of a Gladiator; and such as affect not some such thing, must find diversion and recreation of their thoughts in the contention either of Play or Business: and men justly complain of a great Grief, that they know not what to do. Felicity therefore, by which we mean continual Delight, consisteth not in having prospered, but in prospering.

7. There are few things in this world, but either have Mixture of Good and Evil, or there is a chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other: as for example the Pleasures of Sin and the Bitterness of Punishment are inseparable; as is also Labour and Honour,
for the most part. Now when in the whole Chain
the greater part is good, the whole is called Good; and when the Evil overweigheth, the whole is called Evil.

8. There are two sorts of Pleasure; whereof the
one seemeth to affect the corporeal organ of the Sense, and that I call sensual; the greatest part
whereof is that by which we are invited to give con-
tinuance to our Species; and the next, by which a
man is invited to meat, for the preservation of his indi-
vidual person. The other sort of Delight is not
particular to any part of the body, and is called the
Delight of the Mind, and is that which we call Joy.
Likewise of Pains, some affect the Body, and are
therefore called the Pains of the body; and some not,
and those are called Grief.
CHAP. VIII.

1, 2. **Wherein consist the Pleasures of Sense.**

3, 4. **Of the Imagination or Conception of Power in Man.**

5. **Honour, Honourable, Worth.**

6. **Signs of Honour.**

7. **Reverence.**

8. **Passions.**

1. **Having in the first section of the precedent chapter presupposed that motion and agitation of the brain, which we call Conception, to be continued to the heart, and there to be called Passion; I have therefore obliged myself, as far forth as I am able, to search out and declare from what Conception proceedeth every one of those Passions which we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the things that please and displease are innumerable, and work innumerable ways, men have not taken notice but of a very few, which also are many of them without name.**

2. **And first, we are to consider that of Conceptions there are three Sorts; whereof one is of that which is present, which is Sense; another, of that which is past, which is Remembrance; and the third, of that which is future, which we call Expectation:**
all which have been manifestly declared in the second and third chapters; and every of these Conceptions is Pleasure or Pain present. And first for the Pleasures of the Body which affect the sense of Touch and Taste, as far forth as they be Organical, their conceptions are Sense: so also is the pleasure of all Exonerations of nature: all which passions I have before named Sensual Pleasures, and their contrary, Sensual Pains: to which also may be added the pleasures and displeasures of Odours, if any of them shall be found organical, which for the most part they are not; as appeareth by this experience which every man hath, that the same smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from ourselves; but when we think they proceed from ourselves, they displease not, though they come from others: the displeasure of this is a Conception of hurt thereby from those odours, as being unwholesome, and is therefore a Conception of evil to come, and not present. Concerning the delight of Hearing, it is diverse, and the organ itself not affected thereby: Simple sounds please by Equality, as the sound of a bell or lute: insomuch as it seems, an Equality continued by the percussion of the object upon the ear is Pleasure; the contrary is called Harshness, such as is Grating, and some other sounds, which do not always affect the body, but only sometimes, and that with a kind of horror beginning at the
teeth. Harmony, or many sounds together agreeing, pleases by the same reason as the Unison, which is the sound of equal strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ in any Height, please by Inequality: and Equality alternate; that is to say, the higher Note striketh twice for one stroke of the other, whereby they strike together every second time; as is well proved by Galileo, in the first dialogue concerning local motion: where he also sheweth, that two sounds differing a fifth delight the ear by an Equality of striking after two Inequalities; for the higher note striketh the ear thrice, while the other strikes but twice. In like manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the pleasure of Concord, and the displeasure of Discord, in other difference of notes. There is yet another pleasure and displeasure of Sounds, which consisteth in Consequence of one note after another, diversified both by Accent and Measure; whereof that which pleaseth is called an Air; but for what reason one succession in Tone and Measure is a more pleasing Air than another, I confess I know not; but I conjecture the reason to be, for that some of them imitate and revive some passion which otherwise we take no notice of, and the other not; for, no Air pleaseth but for a time, no more doth Imitation. Also the pleasures of the Eye consist in a certain Equality of Colour: for Light, the most glorious of all Colours, is made by equal operation of the object;
whereas Colour is perturbed, that is to say, unequal Light, as hath been said, Chap. II. Sect. 8. And therefore Colours, the more equality is in them, the more resplendent they are: and as Harmony is pleasure to the Ear, which consisteth of divers sounds; so perhaps may some mixture of divers colours be Harmony to the Eye, more than another mixture. There is yet another delight by the Ear, which happeneth only to men of skill in music, which is of another nature, and not, as these, Conception of the present, but rejoicing in their own skill; of which nature are the Passions of which I am to speak next.

3. Conception of the future is but a supposition of the same, proceeding from remembrance of what is past; and we so far conceive that any thing will be hereafter, as we know there is something at the present that hath power to produce it: and that any thing hath power to produce another thing hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore. Wherefore all Conception of Future is conception of power able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth Pleasure to come, must conceive withal some power in himself by which the same may be attained. And because the Passions, whereof I am to speak next, consist in conception of the future, that is to say, in Conception of the Power past, and the Act to come,
before I go any further, I must in the next place speak somewhat concerning this Power.

4. By this Power I mean the same with the faculties of the Body, Nutritive, Generative, Motive, and of the Mind, Knowledge; and besides these, such further power as by them is acquired, viz. Riches, Place of Authority, Friendship or Favour, and good Fortune; which last is really nothing else but the Favour of God Almighty. The Contraries of these are Impotencies, Infirmities, or Defects of the said powers respectively. And because the power of one man resistent and hindereth the effects of the power of another, Power simply is no more but the excess of the power of one above that of another: for equal Powers opposed destroy one another; and such their opposition is called Contention.

5. The Signs by which we know our own power, are those Actions which proceed from the same; and the Signs by which other men know it, are such Actions; Gesture, Countenance and Speech, as usually such powers produce; and the Acknowledgment of Power is called Honour; and to honour a man inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that that man hath the odds or excess of that power above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself. And Honourable are those signs for which one man acknowledgeth power, or excess above his concurrent,
in another: as for example, Beauty of Person, consisting in a lively aspect of the countenance, and other signs of natural heat, are honourable, being signs precedent of Power generative, and much issue; as also, general Reputation among those of the other sex, because signs consequent of the same. And actions proceeding from Strength of Body and open Force are honourable, as signs consequent of Power motive, such as are Victory in battle or duel, et d'avoir tout son homme. Also to adventure upon great exploits and danger, as being a sign consequent of Opinion of our own strength; and that Opinion a sign of the Strength itself: and to Teach or Persuade are honourable, because they are signs of Knowledge: and Riches are honourable, as signs of the power that acquired them: and Gifts, Cost, and Magnificence of houses, apparel, and the like, are honourable, as signs of riches. And Nobility is honourable by reflection, as a sign of power in the ancestors: and Authority, because a sign of the strength, wisdom, favour or riches by which it is attained. And good Fortune or casual Prosperity is honourable, because a sign of the favour of God, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by Fortune, no less than that we attain unto by Industry. And the Contraries and Defects of these signs are dishonourable; and according to the signs of Honour and Dishonour, so we
estimate and make the value or worth of a man: for so much worth is every thing, as a man will give for the use of all it can do:

6. The Signs of honour are those by which we perceive that one man acknowledgeth the Power and Worth of another; such as these, to praise, magnify, to bless, to call happy, to pray or supplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or present, to obey, to hearken unto with attention, to speak to with consideration, to approach unto in a decent manner, to keep distance from, to give way to, and the like, which are the Honour the Inferior giveth to the Superior.

But the Signs of honour from the Superior to the Inferior, are such as these; to praise or prefer him before his concurrent, to hear more willingly, to speak to him more familiarly, to admit him nearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his opinions, and to give him any gifts rather than money; or if money, so much as may not imply his need of a little; for need of a little is greater poverty than need of much. And this is enough for examples of the Signs of Honour and Power.

7. Reverence is the conception we have concerning another, that he hath the Power to do unto us, both Good and Hurt, but not the Will to do us hurt.
8. In the Pleasure men have, or Displeasure, from the signs of Honour or Dishonour done unto them, consisteth the nature of the Passions, whereof we are to speak in the next Chapter.
CHAP. IX.

2. Humility and Dejection.
5. Anger.
6. Revengefulness.
7. Repentance.
8. Hope, Despair, Diffidence.
10. Pity and Hardness of Heart.
11. Indignation.
12. Emulation and Envy.
13. Laughter.
14. Weeping.
15. Lust.
16. Love.
17. Charity.
18. Admiration and Curiosity.
19. Of the Passion of them that flock to see Danger.
21. A View of the Passions represented in a Race.

GLORY, or internal Gloriation or Triumph of the mind, is the passion which proceedeth from the ima-
gination or conception of our own power above the power of him that contendeth with us; the signs whereof, besides those in the countenance and other gestures of the body which cannot be describ-ed, are, Ostentation in words, and Insolency in actions: and this Passion, of them whom it displeaseth, is called Pride; by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a just valuation of himself. This imagination of our power or worth may be from an assured and certain experience of our own actions; and then is that Glory just, and well-grounded, and begetteth an opinion of increasing the same by other actions to follow; in which consisteth the appetite which we call aspiring, or proceeding from one degree of power to another. The same passion may proceed not from any conscience of our own actions, but from fame and trust of others, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived; and this is false Glory, and the aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill Success. Further, the Fiction, (which is also im-
gination) of actions done by ourselves; which never were done, is Glorifying; but because it begetteth no appetite nor endeavour to any further attempt, it is merely vain and unprofitable; as when a man imagineth himself to do the actions whereof he readeth in some Romance, or to be like unto some other man whose acts he admireth: and this is called Vain Glo-
ry; and is exemplified in the fable, by the Fly sitting
on the axle-tree, and saying to himself, What a dust
do I make rise? The expression of Vain Glory is that
wish which some of the schools, mistaking for some
appetite distinct from all the rest, have called Vel-
leity, making a new word, as they made a new pas-
sion which was not before. Signs of Vain Glory in
the Gesture, are Imitation of others, counterfeiting
and usurping the signs of Virtue they have not; Affec-
tation of fashions, Captation of honour from their
dreams, and other little stories of themselves, from
their country, from their names, and from the like.

2. The Passion contrary to Glory, proceeding
from apprehension of our own Infirmity, is called
Humility by those by whom it is approved; by the
rest, Dejection and Poorness: which conception may
be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth fear to
attempt any thing rashly; if ill, it utterly cows a man,
that he neither dares speak publicly, nor expect good
success in any action.

3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a
good opinion of himself, and upon good ground, may
nevertheless, by reason of the Frowardness which that
passion begetteth, discover in himself some Defect or
Infirmity, the remembrance whereof dejecteth him;
and this passion is called Shame; by which being
cooled and checked in his Forwardness, he is more
wary for the time to come. This passion, as it is a
sign of Infirmity, which is Dishonour; so also it is a
sign of Knowledge, which is Honour. The sign of it is blushing, which appeareth less in men conscious of their own defect, because they less betray the infirmities they acknowledge.

4. **Courage**, in a large signification, is the Absence of Fear in the presence of any Evil whatsoever: but in a strict and more common meaning, it is Contempt of Wounds and Death, when they oppose a man in the way to his end.

5. **Anger**, or sudden Courage, is nothing but the Appetite or desire of overcoming present opposition. It hath been defined commonly to be Grief proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted by the often experience which we have of being moved to Anger by things inanimate, and without sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.

6. **Revengefulness** is that passion which ariseth from an Expectation or Imagination of making him that hath hurt us find his own action hurtful to himself, and to acknowledge the same; and this is the height of revenge: for though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make one's adversary displeased with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity or subjection of an enemy; which was well expressed in the exclamation of Tiberius Caesar concerning one that, to frustrate his
revenge, had killed himself in prison; *Hath he escaped me?* To *kill* is the aim of them that *hate*, to rid themselves out of *fear*: *Revenge* aimeth at *Triumph*, which over the dead is not.

7. *Repentance* is the passion which proceedeth from opinion or knowledge that the action they have done is out of the way to the end they would attain: the effect whereof is to pursue that way no longer, but by the consideration of the end, to direct themselves into a better. The first motion therefore in this passion is *Grief*; but the expectation or conception of returning again into the way is *Joy*; and consequently, the passion of *Repentance* is compounded and allayed of both: but the predominant is *Joy*; else were the whole *Grief*; which cannot be, forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the End he conceiveth good, proceedeth with appetite; and Appetite is Joy, as hath been said, Chap. VII. Sect. 2.

8. *Hope* is Expectation of Good to come, as *Fear* is the Expectation of Evil: But when there be causes, some that make us expect Good, and some that make us expect Evil, alternately working in our mind; if the causes that make us expect Good be greater than those that make us expect Evil, the whole passion is *Hope*; if contrarily, the whole is *Fear*. Absolute Privation of *Hope* is *Despair*; a Degree whereof is *Difidence*.

9. *Trust* is a passion proceeding from the belief
of him from whom we expect or hope for Good, so free from doubt, that upon the same we pursue no other way to attain the same Good: as Distrust or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other means. And that this is the meaning of the words Trust and Distrust, is manifest from this, that a man never provideth himself by a second way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold.

10. Pity is Imagination or Fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more probability that the same may happen to us: for, the Evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon ourselves, the Pity is the less. And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of Good, and therefore not worthy of Calamity. Thence it is also, that men pity the Vices of some persons at the first sight only, out of love to their aspect. The contrary of Pity is Hardness of Heart, proceeding either from Slowness of imagination, or some extreme great opinion of their own Exemption from the like calamity, or from Hatred of all or most men.
11. Indignation is that Grief which consisteth in the conception of good Success happening to them whom they think unworthy thereof. Seeing therefore men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good Fortune they have, but also of their own Virtues. And of all the Passions of the mind, these two, Indignation and Pity, are most raised and increased by Eloquence: for, the aggravation of the Calamity, and Extenuation of the Fault, augmenteth Pity; and the Extenuation of the worth of the person, together with the magnifying of his Success, which are the parts of an Orator, are able to turn these two passions into Fury.

12. Emulation is Grief arising from seeing one's self exceeded or excelled by his Concurrent, together with Hope to equal or exceed him in time to come, by his own Ability. But Envy is the same Grief joined with Pleasure conceived in the Imagination of some ill fortune that may befal him.

13. There is a passion that hath no Name; but the Sign of it is that Distortion of the countenance which we call Laughter, which is always Joy: but what Joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth in Wit, or as they call it, in the Jest, experience confuteth: for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein there lieth no Wit nor Jeat at
all. And forasmuch as the same thing is no more ridiculous when it growth stale or usual, whatsoever it be that moveth Laughter, it must be new and unexpected. Men laugh often (especially such as are greedy of applause from every thing they do well) at their own Actions performed never so little beyond their own expectations; as also at their own Jests: and in this case it is manifest that the passion of Laughter proceedeth from a sudden Conception of some Ability in himself that laugheth. Also men laugh at the Infirmities of others, by comparison wherewith their own Abilities are set off and illustrated. Also men laugh at Jests, the wit whereof always consisteth in the elegant discovering and conveying to our minds some Absurdity of another: and in this case also the passion of Laughter proceeded from the sudden imagination of our own Odds and Eminency: for what is else the recommending of ourselves to our own good Opinion, by comparison with another man's Infirmity or Absurdity? For when a Jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends, of whose dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the passion of Laughter is nothing else but sudden Glory arising from a sudden conception of some Eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the Infirmity of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the Follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remem-
brance, except they bring with them any present Dis-
honour. It is no wonder therefore that men take
heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, tri-
umphed over. Laughing without Offence, must be
at absurdities and infirmities abstracted from persons,
and when all the company may laugh together: for
laughing to one’s self putteth all the rest into jealousy,
and examination of themselves. Besides, it isVain
Glory, and an argument of little Worth, to think the
Infirmity of another sufficient matter for his Tri-
umph.

14. The Passion opposite hereunto, (whose signs
are another Distortion of the face with Tears) called
Weeping, is the sudden falling out with ourselves, or
sudden conception of Defect; and therefore Children
weep: for seeing they think that every thing ought to
be given them which they desire, of necessity every
repulse must be a check of their expectation, and puts
them in mind of their too much weakness to make
themselves masters of all they look for. For the
same cause Women are more apt to weep than Men,
as being not only more accustomed to have their
wills, but also to measure their powers by the Power
and Love of others that protect them. Men are apt
to weep that prosecute Revenge, when the Revenge is
suddenly stopt or frustrated by the repentance of their
adversary; and such are the Tears of Reconciliation.
Also revengeful men are subject to this passion, upon
the beholding those men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in men proceedeth for the most part from the cause it proceedeth from in Women and Children.

15. The Appetite which men call Lust, and the fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is a sensual Pleasure, but not only that; there is in it also a delight of the Mind: for it consisteth of two Appetites together, to please, and to be pleased; and the Delight men take in delighting is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind, consisting in the Imagination of the Power they have so much to please. But the name Lust is used where it is condemned; otherwise it is called by the general word Love: for the Passion is one and the same indefinite Desire of different sex, as natural as Hunger.

16. Of Love, by which is understood the joy man taketh in the fruition of any present good, hath been already spoken in the first Sect. Chap. VII. under which is contained the Love men bear to one another, or Pleasure they take in one another’s company; and by which nature men are said to be sociable. But there is another kind of Love, which the Greeks call ἠγάπη, and is that which we mean, when we say that a Man is in Love: forasmuch as this passion cannot be without diversity of sex, it cannot be denied but that it participateth of that indefinite Love mentioned in the former section. But there
is a great difference betwixt the desire of a man inde-finite, and the same desire limited ad hunc; and this is that Love which is the great theme of Poets: but notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word Need: for it is a conception a man hath of his Need of that one person desired. The cause of this Passion is not always, nor for the most part Beauty, or other quality in the beloved, unless there be withal Hope in the person that loveth: which may be gathered from this, that in great difference of persons, the greater have often fallen in love with the meaner; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better fortune in Love whose hopes are built upon something in their Person, than those that trust to their Expressions and Service; and they that care less, than they that care more: which not perceiving, many men cast away their services; as one arrow after another, till, in the end, together with their Hopes, they lose their Wits.

17: There is yet another Passion sometimes called Love; but more properly Good-will or Charity. There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth Charity. In which, first, is contained that natural affection of parents to their children, which
the Greeks call ἔρωτας; as also, that Affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them. But the Affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on strangers, is not to be called Charity; but either Contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or Fear, which maketh them to purchase Peace. The opinion of Plato concerning honourable Love, delivered according to his custom in the person of Socrates, in the dialogue entitled Convivium, is this; That a man full and pregnant with wisdom and other virtues, naturally seeketh out some beautiful person, of age and capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual respects, ingender and produce the like. And this is the Idea of the then noted Love of Socrates wise and continent, to Alcibiades young and beautiful: in which, Love is not the sought honour, but the issue of his knowledge; contrary to the common Love, to which though issue sometimes follows, yet men seek not that, but to please and to be pleased. It should be therefore this Charity, or desire to assist and advance others. But why then should the wise seek the ignorant, or be more charitable to the beautiful than to others? There is something in it savouring of the use of that time: in which matter though Socrates be acknowledged for continent, yet the Continent have the passion they contain as much and more than they that satiate the appetite; which maketh me sus-
pect this Platonic Love for merely sensual; but with an honourable pretence for the old to haunt the company of the young and beautiful.

18. Forasmuch as all Knowledge beginneth from Experience, therefore also new Experience is the beginning of new Knowledge, and the increase of Experience the beginning of the increase of Knowledge. Whosoever, therefore, happeneth new to a man, giveth him matter of Hope of knowing somewhat that he knew not before. And this hope and expectation of future Knowledge from any thing that happeneth new and strange, is that Passion which we commonly call Admiration; and the same considered as Appetite, is called Curiosity, which is Appetite of Knowledge. As in the discerning of Faculties, men leaveth all community with Beasts at the faculty of imposing Names; so also doth he surmount their nature at this Passion of Curiosity. For when a Beast seeth any thing new and strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas Man, who in most events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the Cause and Beginning of every thing that ariseth new unto him. And from this passion of Admiration and Curiosity, have arisen not only the invention of names, but also supposition of such causes of all things as
they thought might produce them. And from this
begging is derived all Philosophy; as Astronomy
from the admiration of the course of heaven; Natu-
ral Philosophy from the strange effects of the ele-
ments and other bodies. And from the degrees of
Curiosity proceed also the degrees of Knowledge
amongst men: for, to a man in the chase of riches
or authority, (which in respect of Knowledge are but
Sensuality) it is a diversity of little pleasure, whether
it be the motion of the Sun or the Earth that maketh
the Day; or to enter into other contemplations of any
strange accident, otherwise than whether it conduceth or
not to the end he pursueth. Because Curiosity is
Delight, therefore also Novelty is so; but especially
that Novelty from which a man conceiveth an opinion,
true or false, of bettering his own estate; for, in such
case, they stand affected with the hope that all game-
sters have while the cards are shuffling.

19. Divers other Passions there be, but they want
Names; whereof some nevertheless have been by
most men observed; for example; from what pas
sion proceedeth it, that men take pleasure to behold
from the shore the danger of them that are at sea in
a tempest, or in fight; or from a safe castle to behold
two armies charge one another in the field? It is cer-
tainly, in the whole sum, Joy; else men would never
flock to such a Spectacle. Nevertheless there is in
it both Joy and Grief: for as there is Novelty, and
Remembrance of our own security present, which is Delight: so there is also Pity, which is Grief: but the Delight is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends.

20. Magnanimity is no more than glory, of the which I have spoken in the first section; but glory well-grounded upon certain experience of a power sufficient to attain his end in open manner: and Pusillanimitv is the doubt of that. WHATSOEVER therefore is a sign of Vain Glory, the same is also a sign of Pusillanimitv: for sufficient power maketh Glory a spur to one's end. To be pleased or displeased with Fame true or false is a sign of the same, because he that relieth on Fame hath not his success in his own power. Likewise Art and Fallacy are signs of Pusillanimitv, because they depend not upon our own power, but the ignorance of others. Also Proneness to Anger, because it argueth difficulty of proceeding. Also Ostentation of Ancestors, because all men are more inclined to make shew of their own power when they have it, than of others'. To be at Enmity and Contention with Inferiors is a sign of the same, because it proceedeth from want of power to end the war. To laugh at others, because it is an affectation of Glory from other mens' infirmities, and not from any ability of their own. Also Irresolution, which
proceedeth from want of power enough to contain the little difficulties that make deliberations hard.

21. The comparison of the Life of Man to a Race, though it hold not in every part, yet it holdeth so well for this our purpose, that we may thereby both see and remember almost all the Passions before mentioned. But this Race we must suppose to have no other Goal, nor other Garland, but being foremost: and in it,

To endeavour, is Appetite.
To be remiss, is Sensuality.
To consider them behind, is Glory.
To consider them before, is Humility.
To lose ground with looking back, Vain Glory.
To be holden, Hatred.
To turn back, Repentance.
To be in breath, Hope.
To be weary, Despair.
To endeavour to overtake the next, Emulation.
To supplant or overthrow, Envy.
To resolve to break through a stop foreseen Courage.
To break through a sudden stop, Anger.
To break through with ease, Magnanimity.
To lose ground by little hindrances, Pusillanimity.
To fall on the sudden, is disposition to sleep.
To see another fall, is disposition to laugh.
To see one out-gone whom we would not, is Pity.
To see one out-go whom we would not, is Indignation.
To hold fast by another, is to love.
To carry him on that so holdeth, is Charity.
To hurt one's self for haste, is Shame.
Continually to be out-gone, is Misery.
Continually to out-go the next before, is Felicity.
And to forsake the course, is to die.

Note. The Contents prefixed to the four following Chapters, are added by the Editor.
CHAP. X:

1, 2. Causes of Difference of Capacity in Men.
3. Dulness.
4. Wit.
5, 6, 7. Levity, Gravity, and Stolidity.
8. Indocibility.
9, 10, 11. Madness and its degrees.

1. Having shewed in the precedent chapters, that Sense proceedeth from the action of external objects upon the Brain, or some internal substance of the Head; and that the Passions proceed from the alterations there made, and continued to the Heart: it is consequent in the next place, (seeing the diversity of degrees of knowledge in divers men to be greater than may be ascribed to the divers tempers of their brain,) to declare what other causes may produce such odds and excess of Capacity as we daily observe in one man above another. As for that difference which ariseth from sickness, and such accidental distempers, I omit the same, as impertinent to this place; and consider it only in such as have their health, and organs well-disposed. If the difference were in the natural temper of the Brain, I can imagine no reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the Senses; which being equal both in the wise
and less wise, infer an equal temper in the common Organ (namely the Brain) of all the Senses.

2. But we see by experience, that Joy and Grief proceed not in all men from the same causes, and that men differ very much in the constitution of the body; whereby that which helpeth and furthereth vital Constitution in one, and is therefore delightful, hindereth it and crosseth it in another, and therefore causeth Grief. The difference therefore of Wits hath its original from the different Passions, and from the Ends to which the appetite leadeth them.

3. And first, those men whose ends are sensual delight, and generally are addicted to Ease, Food, Operations and Exonerations of the body, must needs be the less thereby delighted with those imaginations that conduce not to those ends; such as are imaginations of Honour and Glory, which, as I have said before, have respect to the future. For Sensuality consisteth in the pleasure of the senses, which please only for the present, and take away the inclination to observe such things as conduce to Honour; and consequently maketh men less curious, and less ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to Knowledge or other Power; in which two consisteth all the excellency of Power Cognitive. And this is it which men call Dulness; and proceedeth from the appetite of sensual or bodily delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such Passion hath its be-
giving from a grossness and difficulty of the motion of the Spirit about the Heart.

4. The contrary hereunto is that quick Ranging of mind, described Chap. IV. Sect. 3. which is joined with Curiosity of comparing the things that come into the mind, one with another; in which comparison a man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected similitude of things, otherwise much unlike, (in which men place the excellency of Fancy, and from whence proceed those grateful similes, metaphors, and other tropes, by which both Poets and Orators have it in their power to make things please and displease, and shew well or ill to others; as they like themselves,) or else in dispersing suddenly dissimilitude in things that otherwise appear the same. And this virtue of the mind is that by which men attain to exact and perfect Knowledge; and the pleasure thereof consisteth in continual instruction, and in distinction of places, persons, and seasons, and is commonly termed by the name of Judgment: for, to judge is nothing else but to distinguish or discern: and both Fancy and Judgment are commonly comprehended under the name of Wit, which seemeth to be a tenacity and agility of spirits; contrary to that restlessness of the spirits supposed in those that are dull.

5. There is another defect of the mind, which men call Levity, which betrays also Mobility in the Spirits, but in excess. An example whereof is in them
that in the midst of any serious discourse, have their minds diverted to every little jest or witty observation; which maketh them depart from their discourse by a parenthesis, and from that parenthesis by another, till at length they either lose themselves, or make their narration like a dream, or some studied nonsense. The passion from whence this proceedeth, is Curiosity, but with too much equality and indifference: for when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed.

6. The virtue opposite to this defect is Gravity, or Steadiness; in which the end being the great and master-delight, directeth and keepeth in the way there-to, all other thoughts.

7. The extremity of Dulness is that natural folly which may be called Stolidity: but the extreme of Levity, though it be natural folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every man's observation, I know not how to call it.

8. There is a fault of the mind called by the Greeks Ἀμαθία, which is Indocibility, or difficulty in being taught; the which must needs arise from a false opinion that they know already the truth of what is called in question: for certainly men are not otherwise so unequal in Capacity, as the Evidence is unequal between what is taught by the mathematicians, and what is commonly discoursed of in other books: and therefore if the minds of men were all of white
paper, they would almost equally be disposed to acknowl-
edge whatsoever should be in right method, and by right ratiocination, delivered to them. But when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentical records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men, than to write legibly upon a paper already scribbled over. The immediate cause therefore of Indocibility is Prejudice; and of Prejudice, false Opinion of our own knowledge.

9. Another, and a principal defect of the mind, is that which men call Madaess; which appeareth to be nothing else but some Imagination of some such predomnancy above the rest, that we have no passion but from it: and this conception is nothing else but excessive Vain Glory, or Vain Dejection; which is most probable by these examples following, which proceed in appearance every one of them from Pride, or some Dejection of mind. As first, we have had the example of one that preached in Cheapside from a cart there, instead of a pulpit, that he himself was Christ, which was spiritual Pride or Madness. We have had also divers examples of learned Madness, in which men have manifestly been distracted upon any occasion that hath put them in remembrance of their own ability. Amongst the learned men, may be remembered (I think also) those that determine of the time of the world's end, and other such the points
of Prophecy. And the gallant madness of Don Quixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain glory, as reading of Romance may produce in pusillanimous men. Also Rage and madness of Love are but great Indignations of them in whose brains is predominant Contempt from their enemies, or their mistresses. And the Pride taken in Form and Behaviour hath made divers men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the name of Fantastic.

10. And as these are the examples of extremities, so also are there examples too many of the degrees, which may therefore be well accounted Follies; as it is a degree of the first, for a man, without certain evidence, to think himself to be inspired, or to have any other effect of God’s holy spirit than other godly men have: of the second, for a man continually to speak his mind in a Canto of other men’s Greek or Latin sentences: of the third, much of the present Gallantry in love and duel. Of Rage, a degree is malice; and of Fantastic madness, affectation.

11. As the former examples exhibit to us Madness and the Degrees thereof, proceeding from the excess of Self-Opinion; so also there be other examples of Madness and the Degrees thereof, proceeding from too much vain Fear and Dejection; as in those melancholy men that have imagined themselves brittle as glass, or have had some other like imagination: and Degrees thereof are all those exor-
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Fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy persons.

CHAP. XI.

1. Names of Things supernatural.
2, 3. God and his Attributes.
4, 5, 6. Spirit.
7. Inspiration.
8, 9, 10. Faith.
11, 12. Our Affections towards God.

1. HITHERTO of the Knowledge of things natural, and of the Passions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give names not only to things natural, but also to supernatural; and by all Names we ought to have some meaning and conception; it followeth in the next place, to consider what thoughts and imaginations of the mind we have, when we take into our mouths the most blessed name of GOD, and the names of those Virtues we attribute unto him; as also, what Image cometh into the mind at hearing the name of Spirit, or the name of Angel, good or bad.

2. And forasmuch as God Almighty is incompre-
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b sensible, it followeth, that we can have no Conception or image of the Deity; and consequently, all his Attributes signify our inability and defect of power to conceive any thing concerning his Nature, and not any Conception of the same, excepting only this, That there is a God. For the effects we acknowledge naturally, do include a Power of their producing, before they were produced; and that Power presupposeth something existent that hath such Power: and the Thing so existing with power to produce, if it were not eternal, must needs have been produced by something before it, and that again by something else before that, till we come to an eternal (that is to say, the first) Power of all Powers, and first Cause of all Causes: and this is it which all men conceive by the name of GOD, implying Eternity, Incomprehensibility, and Omnipotency. And thus all that will consider, may know that God is, though not what he is: even a man that is born blind, though it be not possible for him to have any imagination what kind of thing Fire is, yet he cannot but know that something there is that men call Fire, because it warmeth him.

3. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty, seeing, hearing, speaking, knowing, loving, and the like, by which names we understand something in Men to whom we attribute them, we understand nothing by them in the Nature of God. For, as it is well reasoned Shall not the God that made the Eye,
see, and the Ear, hear? So it is also, if we say, Shall
God, which made the Eye, not see without the Eye;
or that made the Ear, not hear without the Ear; or
that made the Brain, not know without the Brain; or
that made the Heart, not love without the Heart?
The Attributes therefore given unto the Deity are
such as signify either our incapacity or our reverence:
our Incapacity, when we say Incomprehensible and
Infinite; our Reverence, when we give him those
names, which amongst us are the names of those
things we most magnify and commend, as Omnipo-
rent, Omniscient, Just, Merciful, &c. And when
God Almighty giveth those names to himself in the
scriptures, it is but ἄγωνωρα, that is to say, by de-
scending to our manner of speaking; without which
we are not capable of understanding him.

4. By the name of Spirit, we understand a body
natural, but of such subtilty, that it worketh not
upon the senses; but that filleth up the place which
the image of a visible body might fill up. Our con-
ception therefore of Spirit consisteth of figure with-
out colour; and in Figure is understood Dimension;
and consequently, to conceive a Spirit, is to conceive
something that hath Dimension. But Spirits super-
natural commonly signify some Substance without
Dimension; which two Words do flatly contradict
one another: and therefore when we attribute the
name of Spirit unto God, we attribute it not as the
same of any thing we conceive, no more than we
ascribe unto him Sense and Understanding; but, as a
signification of our reverence, we desire to abstract
from him all corporal grossness.

5. Concerning other things, which some men call
Spirits incorporeal, and some corporeal, it is not pos-
sible, by natural means only, to come to the know-
ledge of so much as that there are such things. We
that are Christians acknowledge that there be Angels
good and evil, and that there are Spirits, and that the
Soul of man is a Spirit, and that those Spirits are
immortal; but to know it, that is to say, to have na-
tural evidence of the same, it is impossible: for all
Evidence is Conception, as is said, Chap. VI. Sect. 3.
and all Conception is Imagination, and proceedeth
from Sense, Chap. III. Sect. 1. and Spirits we sup-
pose to be those Substances which work not upon
the Sense; and therefore not conceivable. But
though the Scripture acknowledges Spirits, yet doth
it no where say that they are incorporeal, meaning
thereby, without Dimension and Quality: nor, I
think, is that word incorporeal at all in the Bible; but
it is said of the Spirit, that it abideth in men; some-
times that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it
cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth and
cometh; and that Spirits are angels, that is to say,
messengers: all which words do imply Locality; and
Locality is Dimension; and whatsoever hath Dimen-
sion, is Body, be it never so subtil. To me therefore it seemeth that the Scripture favour eth them more, who hold Angels and Spirits corporeal, than them that hold the contrary. And it is a plain contradiction in natural discourse, to say of the Soul of man, that it is tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte corporis; grounded neither upon Reason nor Revelation, but proceeding from the ignorance of what those things are which are called Spectra, Images that appear in the dark to children, and such as have strong fears, and other strange imaginations; as hath been said, Chap. III. Sect. 5. where I call them Phantasms: for, taking them to be things real, without us, like Bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike to Bodies, what could they call them else, but incorporeal bodies? which is not a Name, but an Absurdity of Speech.

6. It is true that the Heathens, and all nations of the world, have acknowledged that there be Spirits; which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal; whereby it might be thought that a man by natural reason may arrive, without the Scriptures, to the knowledge of this, That Spirits are: but the erroneous collection thereof by the Heathens may proceed, as I have said before, from the ignorance of the cause of Ghosts and Phantasms, and such other Apparitions. And from thence had the Greeks their number of Gods, their number of Demons good or
bad, and for every man his Genius; which is not the acknowledging of this Truth, *That Spirits are*,—but a false Opinion concerning the Force of Imagination.

7. And seeing the knowledge we have of Spirits is not natural knowledge, but faith from supernatural revelation given to the holy writers of the scriptures; it followeth, that of Inspirations also, which is the operation of Spirit in us, the knowledge which we have must all proceed from Scripture. The Signs there set down of Inspiration are *miracles*, when they be great, and manifestly above the power of men to do by imposture; as for example, the Inspiration of *Elias* was known by the miraculous burning of the sacrifice. But the Signs to distinguish whether a Spirit be good or evil, are the same by which we distinguish whether a Man or a Tree be good or evil, namely, Actions and Fruit: for there are *lying Spirits*, wherewith men are inspired sometimes, as well as with *Spirits of Truth*. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the Spirits by their Doctrine, and not of the Doctrine by the Spirits. For *Miracles*, our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our Faith by them, *Matth. xxiv. 24.* And St. Paul saith, *Gal. i. 8.*

*Though an Angel from Heaven preach to you otherwise, &c. let him be accursed:* where it is plain, that we are not to judge whether the Doctrine be true or not, by the Angel; but whether the Angel say true or no, by the Doctrine. So likewise, *1 John*
iv. 1. Believe not every Spirit: for false Prophets are gone out into the world. Verse 2. Hereby shall ye know the Spirit of God. Verse 3. Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, is not of God: and this is the Spirit of Antichrist. Verse 15. Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God. The Knowledge therefore we have of good and evil Inspiration, cometh not by Vision of an Angel that may teach it, nor by a Miracle that may seem to confirm it; but by Conformity of Doctrine with this article and fundamental point of Christian Faith, which also Saint Paul saith is the sole foundation, That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, 1 Cor. iii. 11.

8. But if Inspiration be discerned by this Point, and this Point be acknowledged and believed upon the authority of the Scriptures; how (may some men ask) know we that the Scripture deserveth so great authority, which must be no less than that of the lively Voice of God; that is, how we know the Scriptures to be the Word of God? And first, it is manifest, that if by Knowledge we understand Science infallible and natural, as is defined, Chap. VI. Sect. 4. proceeding from Sense, we cannot be said to know it, because it proceedeth not from the Conceptions ingendered by Sense. And if we understand Knowledge as supernatural, we cannot have it but by In-
spiration: and of that Inspiration we cannot judge, but by the Doctrine. It followeth, that we have not any way, natural or supernatural, of the knowledge thereof, which can properly be called infallible Science and Evidence. It remaineth, that the Knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the word of God, is only Faith; which Faith therefore is also by Saint Paul defined, Heb. xi. 1. to be the Evidence of Things not seen; that is to say, not otherwise evident but by Faith: for, whatsoever either is evident by natural Reason, or Revelation supernatural, is not called Faith; else should not Faith cease, no more than Charity, when we are in heaven; which is contrary to the doctrine of the Scripture. And, we are not said to believe, but to know those things that be evident.

9. Seeing then the acknowledgment of Scriptures to be the word of God is not Evidence but Faith; and Faith (Chap. VI. Sect. 7.) consisteth in the Trust we have of other men, it appeareth plain that the men so trusted are the holy men of God's Church, succeeding one another from the time of those that saw the wonderful works of God Almighty in the flesh. Nor doth this imply that God is not the worker or efficient cause of Faith, or that Faith is begotten in man without the Spirit of God: for all those good opinions which we admit and believe, though they proceed from Hearing, and Hearing from Teaching, both
which are natural, yet they are the Work of God; for, all the works of Nature are his, and they are attributed to the Spirit of God: as for example, Exod. xxviii. 3. Thou shalt speak unto all cunning men, whom I have filled with the Spirit of Wisdom, that they may make Aaron's garments for his consecration, that he may serve me in the Priest's office. Faith therefore, wherewith we believe, is the work of the Spirit of God, in that sense by which the Spirit of God giveth to one man wisdom and cunning in workmanship more than another, and by which he effecteth also, in other points pertaining to our ordinary life, that one man believeth that which, upon the same grounds, another doth not; and one man reverenceth the opinion, and obeyeth the commands of his superior, and others not.

10. And seeing our Faith, that the Scriptures are the word of God, began from the confidence and trust we repose in the Church; there can be no doubt but that their Interpretation of the same Scriptures (when any doubt or controversy shall arise, by which this fundamental point, That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, may be called in question) is safer for any man to trust to than his own, whether Reasoning or Spirit, that is to say, his own Opinion.

11. Now concerning men's Affections to Godward; they are not the same always that are described in the chapter concerning Passions. There, to love is to be
delighted with the image or conception of the thing loved; but God is unconceivable: To love God therefore, in the Scripture, is to obey his Commandments, and to love one another. Also to trust God is different from our trusting one another: for, when a man trusteth a man, (Chap. I.X. Sect. 8.) he layeth aside his own endeavours; but if we do so in our trust to God Almighty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him whom we know we disobey? To trust to God Almighty, therefore, is to refer to his good pleasure all that is above our own power to effect; and this is all one with acknowledging one only God, which is the first commandment. And to trust in Christ is no more but to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamental Article of our Christian Faith: and consequently, to trust, rely, or, as some express it, to cast and roll ourselves on Christ, is the same thing with the fundamental point of Faith, namely, that Jesus Christ is the Son of the living God.

12. To honour God internally in the heart, is the same thing with that we ordinarily call Honour amongst men: for it is nothing but the acknowledging of his Power; and the Signs thereof are the same with the Signs of the Honour due to our superiors, (mentioned Chap. VIII. Sect. 6.) viz. to praise, to magnify, to bless; to pray to him, to thank him, to give oblations and sacrifices to him, to give
attention to his word, to speak to him in prayer with consideration, to come into his presence with humble gesture and in decent manner, and to adorn his worship with magnificence and cost; and these are natural Signs of our honouring him internally: and therefore the contrary hereof, to neglect prayer, to speak to him extempore, to come to church slovenly, to adorn the place of his worship worse than our own houses, to take up his name in every idle discourse, are the manifest Signs of Contempt of the Divine Majesty. There be other Signs which are arbitrary; as, to be uncovered (as we be here;) to put off their shoes, as Moses at the fiery bush; and some other of that kind, which in their own nature are indifferent, till, to avoid indecency and discord, it be otherwise determined by common consent.
CHAP. XII.

1, 2. Deliberation, and Will.
3, 4, 5, 6. Voluntary, Involuntary.
7, 8, 9. Consent, Union, Purpose.

1. It hath been declared already how external objects cause Conceptions, and conceptions Appetite and Fear, which are the first unperceived beginnings of our Actions: for either the Actions immediately follow the first Appetite, as when we do any thing upon a sudden; or else to our first Appetite there succeedeth some conception of evil to happen to us by such actions, which is Fear, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that Fear may succeed a new Appetite, and to that Appetite another Fear alternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate Appetite and Fear ceaseth. This alternate succession of Appetite and Fear, during all the time the action is in our power to do or not to do, is that we call Deliberation; which name hath been given it for that part of the Definition wherein it is said, that it lasteth so long as the Action, whereof we deliberate, is in our power: for, so long we have Liberty to do or
not to do; and Deliberation signifies a taking away of our Liberty.

2. Deliberation therefore requireth in the action deliberated two Conditions; one, that it be future; the other, that there be hope of doing it or possibility of not doing it; for, Appetite and Fear are Expectations of the future; and there is no Expectation of Good, without Hope; or of Evil, without Possibility; of Necessaries therefore there is no Deliberation. In Deliberation, the last Appetite, as also the last Fear, is called Will, viz. the last Appetite, Will to do, or Will to omit. It is all one therefore to say Will and last Will: for, though a man express his present inclination and appetite concerning the disposing of his goods, by words or writings; yet shall it not be counted his Will, because he hath still Liberty to dispose of them otherwise; but when Death taketh away that Liberty, then it is his Will.

3. Voluntary actions and omissions are such as have beginning in the Will; all other are involuntary, or mixed: voluntary, such as a man doth upon Appetite or Fear; involuntary, such as he doth by necessity of Nature; as when he is pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth good or hurt to another; mixed, such as participate of both; as when a man is carried to prison; going is voluntary, to the Prison is involuntary. The example of him, that throweth his goods out of a ship into the sea, to save his person, is
of an action altogether Voluntary; for there is nothing therein Involuntary, but the hardness of the choice, which is not his Action, but the Action of the Winds: what he himself doth is no more against his Will, than to flee from danger is against the Will of him that seeth no other means to preserve himself.

4. Voluntary also are the actions that proceed from sudden Anger, or other sudden Appetite in such men as can discern good or evil; for in them the Time precedent is to be judged Deliberation: for then also he deliberateth in what cases it is good to strike, deride, or do any other action proceeding from Anger or other such sudden Passion.

5. Appetite, Fear, Hope, and the rest of the Passions, are not called voluntary; for they proceed not from, but are the Will; and the Will is not Voluntary: for, a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will; and so make an infinite repetition of the word will; which is absurd and insignificant.

6. Forasmuch as Will to do is Appetite, and Will to omit, Fear; the Cause of Appetite and Fear is the Cause also of our Will: but the propounding of the benefits and harms, that is to say, of Reward and Punishment, is the Cause of our Appetite, and of our Fears, and therefore also of our Wills, so far forth as we believe that such Rewards and Benefits as are propounded shall arrive unto us; and consequently, our Wills follow our Opinions, as our Actions follow our
Wills; in which sense they say truly and properly, that say the World is governed by Opinion.

7. When the Wills of many concur to one and the same action and effect, this Concourse of their Wills is called Consent; by which we must not understand one Will of many Men (for every Man hath his several Will) but many Wills to the producing of one Effect: but when the Wills of divers men produce such actions as are reciprocally resistent one to the other, this is called Contention; and, being upon the persons one of another, Battle: whereas Actions proceeding from Consent are mutual Aid.

8. When many Wills are involved or included in the Will of one or more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared) then is that involving of many Wills in one or more, called Union.

9. In Deliberations interrupted, as they may be by diversion of other business, or by sleep, the last Appetite of such part of the Deliberation is called Intention or Purpose.
CHAP. XIII.

1. Signs.

2, 3. Teaching and Persuading.

4. Two Kinds of Learning.

5, 6, 7. Counselling and other Uses of Speech.

8, 9, 10, 11. Equivocation, Ambiguity, and Inference from Signs.

1. Having spoken of the powers and acts of the mind, both Cognitive and Motive, considered in every man by himself, without relation to others; it will fall fitly into this chapter, to speak of the effects of the same Powers one upon another; which effects are also the signs by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intends. Of these Signs, some are such as cannot easily be counterfeited; as Actions and Gestures, especially if they be sudden, whereof I have mentioned some; (for example, look in Chap. IX.) with the several Passions whereof they are Signs: others there are which may be counterfeited; and those are Words or Speech; of the Use and Effects whereof, I am to speak in this place.

2. The first use of language is the Expression of our Conceptions; that is, the begetting in another the
same Conceptions that we have in ourselves; and this is called *Teaching*; wherein, if the Conception of him that teacheth continually accompany his Words, beginning at something true in experience, then it begeth the like evidence in the hearer that understandeth them, and maketh him to know something, which he is therefore said to *learn*: but if there be not such Evidence, then such teaching is called *Persuasion*, and begeth no more in the hearer than what is in the speaker's bare Opinion. And the Signs of two Opinions contradictory one to another, namely, Affirmation and Negation of the same Thing, is called *Controversy*; but both Affirmations, or both Negations, *Consent in Opinion*.

3. The infallible Sign of teaching exactly, and without error, is this, *that no man hath ever taught the contrary*: not that few, how few soever, if any; for commonly Truth is on the side of a few, rather than of the multitude: but when in opinions and questions considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the men that so discussed them differ from another, then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers subjects wherein they have exercised their pens, and the divers ways in which they have proceeded, together with the diversity of the success thereof: for, those men who
have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the comparison of Magnitudes, Numbers, Times, and Motions, and how their proportions are to one another, have thereby been the authors of all those excellencies by which we differ from such savage people as now inhabit divers places in America; and as have been the inhabitants heretofore of those countries where at this day arts and sciences do most flourish: for, from the studies of these men have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for ornament by Navigation, and whatsoever we have beneficial to human society by the division, distinction, and portraying the face of the Earth; whatsoever we have also by the account of Times, and foresight of the course of Heaven; whatsoever by measuring Distances, Plains, and Solids of all sorts; and whatsoever either elegant or defensible in Building; all which supposed away, what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was any Controversy concerning any Conclusion in this subject; the Science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by conclusions of most difficult and profound Speculation. The Reason whereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their writings; for they proceed from most low and humble principles, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on slowly, and with most scrupulous ratiocination; viz. from the Imposition of Names, they
infer the Truth of their first Propositions; and from
two of the first a third; and from any two of the
three, a fourth; and so on, according to the steps of
Science, mentioned Chap. VI. Sect. 4. On the
other side, those men who have written concerning the
Faculties, Passions, and Manners of men, that is to
say, of Moral Philosophy, and of Policy, Govern-
ment, and Laws, whereof there be infinite volumes,
have been so far from removing Doubt and Contro-
versy in the questions they have handled, that they
have very much multiplied the same. Nor doth any
man at this day so much as pretend to know more
than hath been delivered two thousand years ago by
Aristotle: and yet every man thinks that in this
subject he knoweth as much as any other; supposing
there needeth thereunto no study but what accrueh
unto them by natural Wit; though they play, or
employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth
or place. The reason whereof is no other, than that
in their writings and discourses they take for Prin-
ciples those Opinions which are already vulgarly receiv-
ed, whether true or false, being for the most part
false. There is therefore a great deal of difference
between teaching and persuading; the Sign of this
being Controversy; the Sign of the former, no Con-
troversy.

4. There be two sorts of men that commonly be
called learned: one is that sort that proceedeth evi-
HUM NATURE.

dently from humble principles, as is described in the last section; and those men are called Mathematici: the other are they that take up maxims from their education, and from the authority of men, or of custom, and take the habitual discourse of the tongue for Ratiocination; and these are called Dogmatici. Now seeing in the last section those we call Mathematici are absolved of the crime of breeding Controversy, (and they that pretend not to Learning cannot be accused,) the fault lieth altogether in the Dogmatici, that is to say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with passion press to have their Opinions pass every where for Truth, without any evident demonstration either from Experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation.

5. The expression of those conceptions which cause in us the experience of Good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our expectation of Evil, is that which we call Counselling; and is the internal Deliberation of the mind concerning what we ourselves are to do, or not to do. The Consequences of our actions are our Counsellors, by alternate succession in the mind. So in the Counsel which a man taketh from other men, the Counsellors alternately do make appear the consequences of the action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all him that is counselled with arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself.
6. Another use of speech is expression of Appetite, Intention, and Will; as the appetite of knowledge by Interrogation; appetite to have a thing done by another, as Request, Prayer, Petition; expressions of our purpose or intention, as Promise, which is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in the future; Threatening, which is the promise of evil; and Commanding, which is that speech by which we signify to another our appetite or desire to have any thing done or left undone, for reasons contained in the Will itself: for it is not properly said, Sic volo, sic jubeo, without that other clause, Stet pro Ratione Voluntas: and when the Command is a sufficient Reason to move us to action, then is that Command called a Law.

7. Another use of speech is Instigation and Appeasing, by which we increase or diminish one another's Passion: it is the same thing with Persuasion; the difference not being real; for, the begetting of Opinion and Passion is the same. But whereas in Persuasion we aim at getting Opinion from Passion: here the end is to raise Passion from Opinion, And as in raising an Opinion from Passion, any premisses are good enough to enforce the desired conclusion; so, in raising Passion from Opinion, it is no matter whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration historical or fabulous: for, not the Truth, but the Image, maketh Passion: and a Tragedy well acted affecteth no less than a Murther.
8. Tho' Words be the Signs we have of another's opinions and intentions, because the Equivocation of them is so frequent, according to the diversity of contexture, and of the company wherewith they go, (which the presence of him that speaketh, our sight of his actions, and conjecture of his intentions, must help to discharge us of) it must therefore be extreme hard to find the Opinions and Meaning of those men that are gone from us long ago, and have left us no other signification thereof than their Books; which cannot possibly be understood without History, to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great Prudence to observe them.

9. When it happeneth that a man signifieth unto us two contradictory opinions, whereof the one is clearly and directly signified, and the other either drawn from that by consequence, or not known to be contradictory to it; then (when he is not present to explicate himself better) we are to take the former for his Opinion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly; whereas the other might proceed from error in the deduction, or ignorance of the repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two contradictory expressions of a man's Intention and Will, for the same reason.

10. Forasmuch as whosoever speaketh to another, intendeth thereby to make him understand what he saith; if he speak unto him either in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any
word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that heareth, he intendeth also not to make him understand what he saith; which is a Contradiction of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed.

11. Silence, in him that believeth that the same shall be taken for a sign of his intent, is a Sign thereof indeed: for, if he did not consent, the labour of speaking so much as to declare the same is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.

CONCLUSION.

Thus have we considered the Nature of Man, so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple Elements, wherein the compositions of Politic rules and laws are lastly resolved; which was my present purpose.