THE TREATISE ON
HUMAN NATURE
AND THAT ON
LIBERTY AND NECESSITY
WITH A SUPPLEMENT

BY THOMAS HOBBES.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS
BY THE EDITOR.

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OF

LIBERTY

AND

NECESSITY,

A TREATISE,

wherein all controversy concerning Predestination, Election, Free-will, Grace, Merits, Reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared.
TO THE

SOBER AND DISCREET READER.

IT made St. Chrysostom tremble whenever he reflected on the proportion which those that went the narrow way bore to those which marched in the broad; how many were the called, and how few the chosen; how many they were that were created far and in a capacity of eternal beatitude, and how few attained it. This consideration certainly would make a man look upon the Holy Scriptures among Christians, as the greatest indulgence of Heaven, being all the directions it hath been pleased to afford poor Man in so difficult a journey as that of his eternal bliss or misery. But when a man cometh to look into those transcendent writings, he finds them to be the works of a sort of innocent harmless men, that had little acquaintance or familiarity with the world, and consequently not much interested in the troubles and quarrels of several countries; that though they are all but necessary, yet were they written occasionally, rather than out of design; and lastly, that their main business is to abstract man from this world, and to persuade him to prefer the bare hope of what he can neither see, hear, nor conceive, before all the present enjoyments this world can afford. This begat a reverence and esteem to them in all those who endeavour to work out their salvation out of them. But if a man, not weighing them in themselves, shall consider the practices of those who pretend to
be the interpreters of them, and to make them fit meat for the people; how that instead of renouncing the world, they endeavour to raise themselves into the greatest promotions, leisure, and luxury; that they make them the decoys of the people, to carry on designs and intrigues of state, and study the enjoyments of this world more than any other people; he will find some grounds to conclude the practices of such men to be the greatest disturbance, burden, and vexation of the Christian part of the world. The complaint is as true as sad; instead of acquainting the credulous vulgar with the main end of their functions, and the great business of their embassy, what a great measure of felicity is prepared for them, and how easily it may be forfeited; they involve their consciences in the bristles of a thousand needless scruples, they spin vast volumes out of half sentences, may, out of points and accents, and raise endless controversies about things (were men free from passion and prejudice) in themselves clear enough; and when they have canvassed their questions, till they are weary themselves, and have wearied hearers and readers, and all they have to do with, every one sits down under his own vine, and hews his own apprehensions; so that after all their pains, bandings, and implacable adhesion to parties, the inconvenience remains still, and we as far from any solid conviction, as at first setting out.

The controversies betwixt Rome and the Reformation are long since beaten out of the pit by other combatants of their own brood; so that if we speak of Protestant and Catholic, they are in a Manner content to sit down with their present acquests: first, as to Conviction, be certainly is a rare proselyte, at whose conversion, Interest, Humour, Discontent, Inclination, are not admitted to the debate.

But to come yet nearer our purpose, let us consider our own Fractions of Fractions of Religion here in England; where if that saying,—that it is better to live where nothing is lawful, than where all things,—be as true in Religion as in Policy, posterity
may haply feel the sad consequence of it. What, I pray, is the effect of so many Sermons, Teachings, Preachings, Exercises and Exercising of Gifts, Meetings, Disputations, Conferences, Convocations, Printed Books, written with so much distraction and presumption upon God Almighty, and abuse of his holy word? Marry this, it is the seminary of a many vexations, endless and fruitless controversies; the consequence whereof, are Jealousies, Heart-burnings, Exasperation of parties, the Introduction of factions and national quarrels into matters of Religion, and consequently all the calamities of war and devastation. Besides, they are good lawful diversions for the duller sort of citizens, who contract diseases for want of motion; they supply the building of pyramids among the Egyptians, by diverting the thoughts of the people from matters of state, and consequently from rebellion.

They find work for printers, &c. if the parties interested are troubled with the itch of popularity, and will suffer themselves to be scratched out of somewhat by way of contribution to the impression. Hence are the stationer's shop furnished, and thence the minister's study in the country; who having found out the humour of his auditory, consults with his stationer on what books his money is best bestowed; who very gravely, it may be, will command Cole upon the Philippians, before the excellent (but borrowed) Caryll upon Job. But as to any matter of conviction, we see every one acquiesces in his own sentiments, every one hears the teacher who is most to his humour, and when he hath been at church, and pretends to have sat at his feet, comes home and censures him as he pleases.

To be yet a little more particular, what shall we think of those vast and invincible volumes concerning Predestination, Free-Will, Free-grace, Election, Reprobation, &c. which fill not only our libraries, but the world with their noise and disturbance; whereof the least thing we are to expect is Conviction; every side endeavouring to make good their own grounds, and
keep the cudgels in their hands as long as they can? What
stir is there between the Molinists and Jansenists about Grace
and Merits, and yet both pretend S. Augustin?

Must we not expect that the Jesuits will, were it for no other
end but to vindicate that reputation of learning they have ob-
tained in the world, endeavour to make good their tenets,
though the other were the truer opinion? Is Truth then retired
to that inaccessible rock that admits no approaches? or are we
all turn'd Ixions, and instead of enjoying that Juno, entertain
ourselves with the Clouds of our own persuasions; of which un-
natural coition what other issue can there be but Centaurs and
monstrous opinions? To these Questions I shall not presume to
answer, but in the words of this great author, who answering the
charge of Impiety laid upon the holding of Necessity, says thus;
—If we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be,
but as they are, that is as men, whom either the study of acquiring
Wealth and Preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights,
or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong
principles, have made unfit to discuss the Truth of Things, I must
confess, &c.—

Certainly we have some reason to expect an effectual cure from
this man, since he hath so fortunately found out the disease. Now
if he in so few sheets hath performed more than all the volumi-
nous works of the Priests and Ministers, and that in points of
soul-concernment and christian interest, as Predestination, Free-
will, Grace, Merits, Election, Reprobation, Necessity, and Li-
berty of Action, and others, the main hinges of human salvation;
and to do this, being a person, whom not only the aveneness of
his nature to engage himself in matters of controversy of this
kind, but his severer study of the Mathematics might justly ex-
empt from such skirmishes; we may not stick to infer, that the
Black-Coats, generally taken, are a sort of ignorant Tinkers, who
in matters of their own profession, such as is the mending and
sodering of men's consciences, have made more holes than they
found; nay, what makes them more impardonable, they have neither gratitude nor ingenuity to acknowledge this repairer of their breaches, and assessor of their reputation, who hath now effected what they all this while, have been tampering about. I know this author is little beholding to the ministers, and they make a great part of the nation; and besides them, I know there are a many illiterate, obstinate, and inconvincible spirits: yet I dare advance this proposition; how bold soever it may seem to some, that this book, how little and contemptible soever it may seem, contains more evidence and conviction in the matters it treats of, than all the volumes, nay libraries, which the Priests, Jesuits, and Ministers have, to our great charge, distraction, and loss of precious time, furnished us with. Which if so, I shall undertake for any rational man, that all the controversial labours concerning Religion in the world, all the polemical treatises of the most ancient or modern, shall never breed any maggots of scruples, or dissatisfaction in his brains; nor shall his eyes or head ever ake with turning them over; but he shall be so resolved in mind as never to importune God Almighty with impertinent addresses, nor ever become any of those enthusiastical Spiritati, who, as the most learned Mr. White says, expound Scripture without sense or reason (and are not to be disputed with, but with the same success as men write on sand) and trouble their neighbours with their dreams, revelations, and spiritual whimsies. No; here is solid conviction, at least so far as the metaphysical mysteries of our Religion will admit. If God be omnipotent, he is irresistible; if so, just in all his actions, though we (who have as much capacity to measure the justice of God's actions, as a man born blind to judge of colours) haply may not discern it. What then need any man trouble his head whether he be predestinated or no? Let him live justly and honestly according to the Religion of his Country, and refer himself to God for the rest; since he is the potter, and may do what he please with the
Either then the publisher was author of this Preface, or Hobbes himself, not having the courage to acknowledge so free a censure of the Clergy and their works, spoke in the highest terms of his own performance in order to escape suspicion.

EDITOR.
TO THE

LORD MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE.

Right Honourable,

I HAD once resolved to answer my Lord Bishop's objections to my book De Civc in the first place, as that which concerns me most; and afterwards to examine his discourse of Liberty and Necessity, which (because I never uttered my opinion of it) concerned me the less. But seeing it was your Lordship's and my Lord Bishop's desire that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do; and I here present and submit it to your Lordship's judgment.

And first, I assure your Lordship, I find in it no new argument, neither from Scripture, nor from Reason, that I have not often heard before; which is as much as to say, I am not surprized.

The Preface is a handsome one; but it appeareth even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus, If I be free to write this discourse, I have obtained the cause: I deny that to be true; for 'tis enough to his freedom of writing, that he
had not written it unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove, that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should write it afterward. It may be, his Lordship thinks it all one to say, I was free to write it, and, It was not necessary I should write it; but I think otherwise: for he is free to do a thing, that may do it, if he have the Will to do it, and may forbear, if he have the Will to forbear: and yet if there be a Necessity that he shall have the Will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a Necessity that he shall have the Will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The Question therefore is not,—Whether a Man be a free Agent,—that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his Will; but,—whether the Will to write, and the Will to forbear, come upon him according to his Will, or according to any thing else in his own power.—I acknowledge this Liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech: wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his Preface.

In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of Liberty, and says, he meaneth not Liberty from Sin, nor from Servitude, nor from Violence, but, from Necessity, Necessitation, Inevitability, and Determination to one.

It had been better to define Liberty, than thus to
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distinguish; for I understand never the more what he means by Liberty; and though he say he means Liberty from Necessitation, yet I understand not how such a Liberty can be; and 'tis a taking of the question without proof: for what is else the question between us but,—Whether such a Liberty be possible or not?

There are in the same place other distinctions; as, a Liberty of Exercise only (which he calls a Liberty of Contradiction,) namely, of doing not Good or Evil simply, but of doing this or that Good, or this or that Evil respectively: and a Liberty of Specification and Exercise also (which he calls a Liberty of Contrariety) namely, a Liberty not only to do or not to do Good or Evil, but also to do or not to do this or that Good or Evil.

And with these Distinctions his Lordship says he clears the coast; whereas in truth he darkeneth his own meaning and the question, not only with the jargon of Exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending Distinction where none is: for how is it possible that the Liberty of doing or not doing this or that Good or Evil, can consist, (as he says it does, in God and good Angels) without a Liberty of doing or not doing Good or Evil?

The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his Forces (as he calls
them) into two Squadrons, one of places of Scriptures, the other of Reasons: which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say touching this is, that I observe a great part of those his Forces do look and march another way, and some of them fight among themselves.

And the first place of Scripture taken from Numb. xxx. 14. is one of those that look another way; the words are, *If a Wife make a vow, it is left to her Husband's choice either to establish it or make it void.* For it proves no more but that the husband is a free and voluntary agent, but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose by precedent necessary Causes.

For if there come into the husband's mind greater Good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the Establishing will follow necessarily; and if the Evil that will follow thereon, in the husband's opinion, outweigh the Good, the contrary must needs follow: and yet in this following of one's Hopes and Fears consisteth the nature of Election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this; and consequently Choosing and Necessity are joined together.

The second place of Scripture is *Joshua* xxiv. 15. The third is 2 *Sam.* xxiv. 12. whereby it is clearly proved that there is *Election* in Man; but not proved that such *Election* was not *necessitated* by the
Hopes and Fears, and considerations of Good and Bad to follow, which depend not on the Will, nor are subject to Election. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if they were a thousand.

But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer, as I have done, that Necessity and Election might stand together; and instance in the actions of Children, Fools, or brute Beasts, whose Fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined to one; before these his proofs out of Scripture, desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says, that the actions of Children, Fools, Madmen, and Beasts, are indeed determined, but that they proceed not from Election, nor from free but from spontaneous Agents. As for example, that the Bee, when it maketh honey, does it spontaneously; and when the Spider makes his web, he does it spontaneously, but not by election.

Though I never meant to ground my answer upon the experience of what Children, Fools, Madmen, and Beasts do; that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by spontaneous, and how it differeth from voluntary, I will answer that distinction, and shew that it figheth against its fellow arguments.

Your Lordship is therefore to consider, that all Voluntary actions, where the thing that induceth the Will is not Fear, are called also Spontaneous, and said to be done by a man's own accord: as when a
man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is Sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous: though to give one's money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is Fear, be not called spontaneous. But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary; for voluntary presupposes some precedent Deliberation, that is to say, some Consideration, and Meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our own accord, and are therefore spontaneous, of which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never consulted nor deliberated in ourselves: as when, making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but the thing we are about is good, we Eat or Walk, or in anger Strike or Revile, which my Lord thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary nor elective actions; and with such kind of actions he says Necessitation may stand, but not with such as are voluntary, and proceed upon Election and Deliberation. Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that even these actions, which, he says, proceed from Spontaneity, and which he ascribes only to Children, Fools, Madmen, and Beasts, proceed from Deliberation and Election; and that actions inconsiderate, rash, and spontaneous, are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and
many more thought as wise, or wiser than ordinarily men are; then my Lord Bishop's argument concludeth that Necessity and Election may stand together; which is contrary to that which he intended by all the rest of his arguments to prove.

And first, your Lordship's own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that Horses, Dogs, and other brute Beasts, do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take: the Horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spar. And what else doth a man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action, another while retire from it, as the Hope of greater Good draws him, or the Fear of greater Evil drives him away.

A child may be so young as to do what it does without all Deliberation; but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the red: for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be deliberated on the second time.

Fools and Madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice; the images of things being by disease altered.

For Bees and Spiders, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not only Election, but Art, Prudence, and Policy in them, very near equal to
that of mankind. Of Bees Aristotle says, their Life is Civil.

Again, his Lordship is deceived if he think any spontaneous action, after once being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective: for even the setting of a man's foot in the posture for walking, and the action of ordinary eating, was once deliberated of how and when it should be done; and though afterward it became easy and habitual, so as to be done without forethought, yet that does not hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceeds from election: so also are the rashest actions of choleric persons voluntary and upon deliberation: for who is there, but very young children, who hath not considered when and how far he ought, or safely may strike or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me, that such actions are necessitated, and the Fancy of those that do them determined to the action they do, it follows, out of his Lordship's own doctrine, that the Liberty of Election does not take away the Necessity of electing this or that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments fights against another.

The second argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, when if they would, they might have done another: the places are two; one is 1 Kings iii. 11. where the history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked Riches, or Revenge, did nevertheless ask Wisdom at God's hands; the other is the
words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v. 4. *After it was sold, was it not in thine own Power?*

To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places; that they prove there is *Election*, but do not disprove the *Necessity*, which I maintain, of what they so elect.

The fourth argument (for to the third and fifth I shall make but one answer) is to this effect;—If the decree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true Liberty, then *Adam* before his fall had no true Liberty. *Quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi.*—

That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action (that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning) is the *Sum of all those things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced.* This Concourse of Causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal Cause of all things, God Almighty) the Decree of God.

But that the Foreknowledge of God should be a *Cause of any thing, cannot be truly said; seeing Fore-
knowledge is Knowledge; and Knowledge depends on the existence of the Things known, and not they on it.

The Influence of the Stars is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents.

Nor does the Concourse of all Causes make one simple chain or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains, joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link, God Almighty, and consequently the whole Cause of an event doth not always depend on one single chain, but on many together.

Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents, and necessitates the Will, and consequently the Action; but for Moral efficacy, I understand not what he means by it.

The last Dictate of the Judgment, concerning the Good or Bad that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole Cause, but the last part of it; and yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily; in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horse's back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it.

Now for his argument,—that if the Concourse of all the Causes necessitate the Effect, then it follows, Adam had no true Liberty:—I deny the consequence; for I make not only the Effect, but also the Election of that particular effect necessary; inasmuch
as the Will itself, and each Propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient Cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that Fire should burn, than that a Man or other creature, whose limbs be moved by Fancy, should have election, that is liberty, to do what he hath a Fancy to; though it be not in his Will or Power to choose his Fancy, or choose his Election and Will.

This Doctrine, because my Lord Bishop says he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed; as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

The arguments of greatest consequence are the third and the fifth; and they fall both into one, namely;—If there be a Necessity of all events, then it will follow that Praise and Reprehension, and Reward and Punishment, are all vain and unjust; and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid; there would be no belief among them of Heaven and Hell.

To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom. ix. 11. From ver. 11. of the Chapter to the 18th, is laid down the very same objection in these words: When they (meaning Esau and Jacob) were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to Election, not by
Works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto her (viz. Rebecca) that the elder should serve the younger, &c. What then shall we say? Is there Injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that sheweth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be set forth in all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth, he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth. Thus you see the case put by St. Paul, is the same with that of my Lord Bishop, and the same objection in these words following:

Thou wilt ask me then, Why does God yet complain, for who hath resisted his Will?

To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God's will, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus: Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest God? shall the Work say to the Workman, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour? According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, answer my Lord's objection, and say, the Power of God alone, without other help, is sufficient Justification of any action he doth. That which Men make among themselves here by
pacts and covenants, and call by the name of Justice, and according whereunto men are accounted and termed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God Almighty's actions are to be measured or called just; no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does is made just by his doing it; just, I say, in him, though not always just in us.

For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him he so commanded, for not doing it, is unjust. So also, His Counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, but justified his afflicting of him, by telling him of his Power. Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine? Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the Earth? and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, or for his parent's sin, but that the Power of God might be shewn in him. Beasts are subject to death and torments; yet they cannot sin: it was God's will they should be so. Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found; less Power does not: and because such Power is in God only, he must needs be just in all his actions; and we, that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it.
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I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer; by distinguishing between Will and Permission; as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes permit sin; and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed; but does not will it; nor necessitate it.

I know also they distinguish the Action from the Sin of the Action; saying that God Almighty does indeed cause the Action, whatsoever action it be, but not the Sinfulness and Irregularity of it, that is, the Discordance between the Action and the Law. Such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding; I find no difference between the Will to have a thing done, and the Permission to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an Action and the Sin of that Action; as for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah: nor when one is Cause both of the Action and of the Law, how another can be Cause of the Disagreement between them; no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the Inequality that is between them. This I know,—God cannot sin; because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently, no Sin; as also, because whatsoever can sin is subject to another's Law, which God is not. And therefore 'tis blasphemy to say, God can sin; but to say, that God can so
order the world, as a Sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any disho-
nour to him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions
can make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau’s
or Pharaoh’s actions proceeded from the will and
purpose of God; or that proceeding from his Will,
could not therefore without injustice be blamed or
punished; I will, as soon as I understand them, turn
unto my Lord’s opinion: for I now hold nothing in
all this question between us, but what seemeth to me,
not obscurely, but most expressly said in this place by
St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of
Scripture.

To the Arguments from Reason.

Of the arguments from Reason, the first is that
which his Lordship saith is drawn from Zeno’s beat-
ing of his man; which is therefore called Argumen-
tum baculinum, that is to say, a wooden argument.
The story is this, Zeno held that all actions were ne-
cessary; his man therefore being for some fault
beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it: to
avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the
necessity of beating him. So that not he that main-

g
tained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten; contrary to that his Lordship would infer: and the argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.

The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it; and therefore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop ought, at my request, to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none; and what use soever be made of truth, yet Truth is Truth; and now the question is not, what is fit to be preached, but what is true.

The first inconvenience, he says, is this; That the Laws, which prohibit any action, will be unjust.

2. That all Consultations are vain.

3. That admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use than to children, fools, and madmen.

4. That Praise, Dispraise, Reward and Punishment are in vain.

5, 6. That Counsels, Arts, Arms, Books, Instruments, Study, Tutors, Medicines, are in vain.

To which arguments his Lordship expecting I should answer, by saying, the Ignorance of the Event were enough to make us use the Means, adds, (as it were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words: Alas! how should our not knowing the Event be a
sufficient Motive to make us use the Means? Wherein his Lordship says right; but my answer is not that which he expecteth: I answer,

First, That the Necessity of an action doth not make the Laws that prohibit it unjust. To let pass, that not the Necessity, but the Will to break the Law, maketh the action unjust; because the Law regardeth the Will, and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no Law can possibly be unjust; inasmuch as every man maketh (by his consent) the Law he is bound to keep; and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself. I say, what necessary cause soever precede an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the Law on pain of death prohibit stealing; and that there be a man, who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death; does not this punishment deter others from theft? Is it not a Cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their Wills to Justice?

To make the Law is therefore to make a Cause of Justice, and to necessitate Justice; and consequently, 'tis no Injustice to make such a Law.

The Intention of the Law is not to grieve the Delinquent, for that which is past, and not to be undone; but to make him and others just, that else would not be so; and respecteth not the Evil Act past, but the
Good to come; insomuch as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a delinquent could justify his killing, in the sight of God. But you will say, How is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were necessary? To this I answer, That men are justly killed, not for that their Actions are not necessitated, but because they are noxious; and that they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For where there is no Law, there no killing, nor any thing else, can be unjust; and by the right of nature, we destroy (without being unjust) all that is noxious, both beasts and men: and for beasts, we kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preservation; and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions as being only spontaneous, and not free, are all necessitated and determined to that one thing they shall do. For Men, when we make societies or commonwealths, we lay down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murder, theft, or other offensive action; so that the Right which the Commonwealth hath to put a man to death for crimes, is not created by the Law; but remains from the first Right of Nature, which every Man hath to preserve himself; for that the Law doth not take that Right away in the case of Criminals, who were by Law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or punished, for that their theft proceedeth from Election; but because it was noxious,
and contrary to men's preservation, and the Punishment conduce to the preservation of the rest; insomuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh men's Wills such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the Necessity of a voluntary action cannot be inferred the Injustice of the Law that forbiddeth it, or of the Magistrate that punisheth it.

Secondly, I deny that it makes Consultations to be in vain; 'tis the Consultation that causeth a man, and necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of Consultation out of the Necessity of the Election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordship reasons thus: — If I must do this rather than that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; — which is a false proposition, and a false consequence, and no better than this; If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day. If there be a Necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass: and therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another; 'tis determined also for what Cause it shall so be chosen; which Cause, for the most part, is
Deliberation or Consultation; and therefore Consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the Election is more necessitated; if more and less had any place in Necessity.

The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience, namely,—that Admonitions are in vain;—for Admonitions are parts of Consultation, the Admonitor being a Counsellor for the time to him that is admonished.

The fourth pretended inconvenience is,—that Praise, Dispraise, Reward and Punishment, will be in vain. To which I answer, that for Praise and Dispraise, they depend not at all on the Necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good? Good I say, for me, or for some body else, or for the state and commonwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to say, it is as I would wish, or as another would have it, or according to the will of the state, that is to say, according to the Law? Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from Necessity? Things may be therefore necessary, and yet praise-worthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraise, and neither of them both in vain; because Praise and Dispraise, and likewise Reward and Punishment, do by example make and conform the Will to Good or Evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where
he says that he was good by Nature, & quia aliter esse non potuit.

To the fifth and sixth inconveniences,—that Counsels, Arts, Arms, Instruments, Books, Study, Medicines, and the like, would be superfluous,—the same answer serves as to the former; that is to say, that this Consequence, *If the Effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its Causes,* is a false one; and those things named Counsels, Arts, Arms, &c. are the Causes of these Effects.

His Lordship's third argument consisteth in other inconveniences, which he saith will follow, namely,—Impiety and Negligence of religious Duties, as Repentance and Zeal to God's service, &c.—

To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the Truth of Things; I must, I say, confess, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their Piety; and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this answer, I should not have written it; nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and he will keep it private. Nevertheless in very truth, the Necessity of events does not of itself draw with
it any Impiety at all. For Piety consisteth only in two things; one, that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his Power as we can, (for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power;) the other, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called Cultus, or Worship of God. He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from God’s eternal Will, and consequently are necessary, does he not think God Omnipotent? Does he not esteem of his Power as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external Acts and Words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call Worship. So that this Opinion fortifies Piety in both kinds, external and internal; therefore is far from destroying it. And for Repentance, which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way; though the Cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again, though the Cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remain still the Causes of Joy. So that the Necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of Repentance, Grief for the error, nor Joy for the returning.
And for Prayer, whereas he saith that the necessity of Things destroys Prayer; I deny it: for though Prayer be none of the causes that move God's Will, (his Will being unchangeable) yet since we find in God's word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask them, the Motive to Prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God no less than the Blessing; and the Prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the Blessing is decreed. 'Tis manifest that Thanksgiving is no cause of the Blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary; yet even amongst men, Thanks is in use as an acknowledgment for the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And Prayer to God Almighty is but Thanksgiving for God's blessings in general; and though it preceded the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner, as he, not as we will; and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray,—thy Will (not our Will) be done,—and by example teaches us the same, for he prayed thus,—Father, if it be thy Will, let this Cup pass, &c.—The End of Prayer, as of Thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honour God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him only.

The fourth argument from Reason is this,—The Order, Beauty, and Perfection of the world requireth
that in the Universe should be agents of all sorts; some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth overthrow the Beauty and Perfection of the World.

In which argument I observe, first a Contradiction; for seeing he that maketh any thing, in that he maketh it, maketh it to be necessary; it followeth that he that maketh all things maketh all things necessarily to be: as if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be; so if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the Beauty of the world requireth, (though we know it not) that some agents should work without deliberation, (which his Lordship calls necessary agents) and some agents with deliberation, (and those both he and I call free agents) and that some agents should work, and we not know how, (and their Effects we both call Contingent); but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his Election necessarily determined to one by former causes; and that which is contingent and imputed to Fortune be nevertheless necessary, and depend on precedent necessary Causes. For by contingent, men do not mean that which hath no Cause, but that which hath not for Cause any thing that we perceive: as for example, when a Traveller meets with a Shower, the Journey had a Cause, and the Rain had a Cause sufficient to produce it; but because the Journey
caused not the Rain, nor the Rain the Journey; we say they were contingent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three Sorts of events, necessary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary, without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the Universe.

To the fifth argument from Reason, which is, _that if Liberty be taken away, the Nature and formal Reason of Sin is taken away_; I answer by denying the consequence: The Nature of Sin consisteth in this, that the Action done proceed from our Will, and be against the Law. A Judge, in judging whether it be Sin or not, which is done against the Law, looks at no higher cause of the action than the Will of the doer. Now when I say the Action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the Will of the doer, but _with_ his Will, and _so necessarily_; because man's Will, that is, every Volition, or Act of the Will and Purpose of Man, had a _sufficient_, and therefore a _necessary_ Cause; and consequently every _voluntary_ Action was _necessitated_. An Action therefore may be _voluntary_ and a _Sin_, and nevertheless be _necessary_; and because God may afflict by a right derived from his Omnipotence, though Sin were not; and because the example of Punishment on voluntary sinners is the _Cause_ that produceth Justice, and maketh Sin less frequent; for God to punish such Sinners (as I have shewed before) is no Injustice. And thus you have
my Answer to his Lordship's Objections, both out of Scripture, and from Reason.

Certain Distinctions, which his Lordship supposing might be brought to evade his Arguments, are by him removed.

He says a man may perhaps answer, that the Necessity of Things held by him is not a Stoical Necessity, but a Christian Necessity, &c. But this Distinction I have not used, nor indeed ever heard before: nor did I think any man could make Stoical and Christian two kinds of Necessity, though they may be two kinds of Doctrine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his Lordship's arguments from the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.

But here I must take notice of certain Words of his Lordship's in this place, as making against his own Tenet.—Where all the Causes, saith he, being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total Cause, if any one Cause (much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of Causes, be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the Effect necessary.—For that
which I call the Necessary Cause of any Effect, is the joining together of all Causes subordinate to the first into one total Cause. If any of these, saith he, especially the first, produce its Effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first Cause is a necessary Cause of all the Effects that are next and immediate to it; and therefore, by his Lordship's own reason, all Effects are necessary.

Nor is that distinction of Necessary in respect of the first Cause, and Necessary in respect of second Causes, mine; it does (as his Lordship well notes) imply a contradiction. But the distinction of Free into free from Compulsion, and free from Necessitation; I acknowledge. For to be free from Compulsion is to do a thing so as Terror be not the cause of his Will to do it; for a man is then only said to be compelled, when Fear makes him willing to it; as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself; or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do any thing for Love, or Revenge, or Lust, are free from Compulsion, and yet their actions may be as necessary as those that are done by Compulsion; for sometimes other Passions work as forcibly as Fear. But free from Necessitation, I say, no man can be; and 'tis that which his Lordship undertook to disprove.

This distinction, his Lordship says, useth to be fortified by two reasons (but they are not mine.) The
first, he says, is, that it is granted by all Divines, that an Hypothetical Necessity, or Necessity upon Supposition, may stand with Liberty. That you may understand this, I will give you an example of Hypothetical Necessity. If I shall live, I shall eat. This is an Hypothetical Necessity. Indeed it is a necessary proposition; that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true whenever uttered; but 'tis not the Necessity of the Thing, nor is it therefore necessary, that the man should live, nor that the man should eat. I do not use to fortify my distinctions with such reasons; let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an easy and plain thing, (but withal false) with the grave usage of such words as Hypothetical Necessity, and Necessity upon Supposition, and such like Terms of Schoolmen, may be obscured, and made to seem profound Learning.

The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from Compulsion, and free from Necessitation, he says is, that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of it, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is true that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are free; but because I find not in the Articles of our Faith, nor in the Decrees of our Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good Angels to work by
necessity, or in what sense they work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point, and am content that there be a freedom from compulsion, and yet no freedom from necessitation, as hath been proved, in that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats and without fear of danger. But how my Lord can avoid the consisting together of Freedom and Necessity, supposing God and good Angels are freer than Men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must examine: I confess, saith he, that God and good Angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of Freedom, not extensively in the latitude of the Object, according to a Liberty of Exercise, not of Specification.

Again, we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom, to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader: for it cannot be conceived that there is any Liberty greater than for a man to do what he will. One Heat may be more intensive than another, but not one Liberty than another: he that can do what he will hath all liberty possible, and he that cannot hath none at all. Also Liberty (as his Lordship says the schools call it) of Exercise, which is, as I have said before, a Liberty to do or not to do, cannot be without a Liberty (which they call) of Specification, that is to say, a Liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular. For how can
a man conceive he hath liberty to do any thing, that hath not liberty to do this or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools; and I do not doubt, but that the imposing of them, by authority of Doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over men's Reason and Understanding; especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by pretence of Learning, and more Judgment than that of other men.

In the next place, his Lordship bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between free from Compulsion, and free from Necessitation.

The first is, that Election is opposite not only to Coaction or Compulsion, but also to Necessitation or Determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it; and to those brought formerly I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that Election is opposite to either; for when a man is compelled, for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still Election left him, and
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a Deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath Election, and may deliberate whether he will be hauled and trailed on the ground, or make use of his own feet. Likewise when there is no Compulsion, but the strength of Temptation to do an evil action, being greater than the Motives to abstain, necessarily determines him to the doing of it; yet he deliberates, while sometimes the Motives to do, sometimes the Motives to forbear, are working on him; and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge Necessity; but when we see not; or mark not the Force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not Causes but Liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of Necessity chooses it; but they might as well say, Fire doth not burn, because it burns of Necessity.

The second argument is not so much an Argument as a Distinction, to shew in what sense it may be said, that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in what sense not. And therefore his Lordship allledged, (as from the authority of the Schools, and that which ripeth up the bottom of the Question) that there is a double act of the Will: — The one, he says, is Actus imperatus, an act done at the command of the Will, by some inferior Faculty of the Soul, as to open
or shut one's eyes; and this act may be compelled; the other, he says, is Actus elicitus, an act allured or drawn forth by allurement out of the Will, as to will, to choose, to elect; this, he says, cannot be compelled. — Wherein (letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing Command and Subjection to the Faculties of the Soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the Truth of a question) you may observe, first, that to compel a voluntary Act is nothing else but to will it; for it is all one to say,—my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action; and to say—I have the will to shut my eyes. So that Actus imperatus here might as easily have been said in English a voluntary action; but that they that invented the Term understood not any thing it signified.

Secondly, you may observe that Actus elicitus is exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to choose, which are all one; and so to will is here made an act of the Will; and indeed as the Will is a faculty or power of a man's Soul, so to will is an act of it, according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to Dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the Ability to dance; so is it also to say, that to Will is an act allured or drawn out of the Power to will; which Power is commonly called the Will. Howsoever it be, the Sum of his Lordship's distinction is,—that a voluntary act may be done by com-
pulsion, that is to say, by foul means; but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by allurement, or fair means.—Now, seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce, as necessarily as foul means and threatening; it follows, that to will may be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion. So that Distinction of Actus imperatus and Actus elicitus is but Words, and of no effect against Necessity.

His Lordship in the rest of his discourse reckoneth up the opinions of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the Necessity of Things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first he saith, the Astrologer deriveth his necessity from the Stars: secondly, that the Physician attributeth it to the Temper of the Body. For my part, I am not of their opinion; because, neither the Stars alone, nor the Temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any effect, without the Concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concurs not whatsoever is in Rerum Natura; which, because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place.

Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say,—External Objects presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make their actions necessary, and says, the power such Objects have over us,
proceeds from our own Fault:—but that is nothing to the purpose, if such Fault of ours proceedeth from Causes not in our own power; and therefore that Opinion may hold true for all this Answer.

Further he says, Prayer, Fasting, &c. may alter our habits;—'tis true; but when they do so, they are Causes of the contrary Habit, and make it necessary; as the former habit had been necessary, if Prayer, Fasting, &c. had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent.

Fourthly, he says, a resolved mind is not easily surprised; as the mind of Ulysses, who, when others wept, alone wept not; and of the Philosopher, that abstained from striking, because he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the water, when he was thirsty; and the like. Such things, I confess, have, or may have been done; and do prove only that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor for that other man to drink; but it does not prove that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain (as he did) from weeping, nor for the Philosopher to abstain (as he did) from striking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking; and yet that was the thing his Lordship ought to have proved.

Lastly, his Lordship confesses, that the Disposi-
tion of objects may be dangerous to Liberty, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer, it is impossible: for Liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost (which he confesses) I may infer it can be in no danger at all.

The fourth opinion his Lordship rejecteth, is of them that make the Will necessarily to follow the last Dictate of the Understanding: but it seems his Lordship understands that Tenet in another sense than I do: for he speaketh as if they that held it did suppose men must dispute the Sequel of every Action they do, great and small, to the least grain, which is a thing his Lordship (with reason) thinks untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the Will follows the last opinion, or judgment immediately preceding the action, concerning whether it be good to do it or not, whether he have weighed it long before, or not at all; and that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example, when a man strikes, his Will to strike follows necessarily that Thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, immediately before the lifting up of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sense, the last dictate of the understanding does necessitate the Action, though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause; as the last Feather necessitates the breaking of a Horse's back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needed but the addition of that one to make the weight sufficient.
That which his Lordship alledged against this is, first, out of a Poet, who in the person of Medea says,

—Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor.

But that saying (as pretty as it is) is not true: for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last Dictate of her judgment was, that the present Revenge on her husband outweighed them all; and thereupon the wicked action necessarily followed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors said, one had the better Reasons, but the other must have the Office. This also maketh against his Lordship; for the last Dictate of his judgment that had the bestowing of the office, was this,—that it was better to take a great Bribe, than reward a great Merit.

Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the Sense move more powerfully than Reason. What followeth thence but this,—The Sense of the present Good is commonly more immediate to the action, than the Foresight of the evil Consequences to come?

Fourthly, whereas his Lordship says that,—do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the Death of his Son, than for the Sin of his Soul,—it makes nothing to the last Dictate of the Understanding; but it argues plainly that Sorrow for Sin is not voluntary;
and by consequence that Repentance proceedeth from Causes.

The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordship's opinion about reconciling Liberty with the Prescience and Decrees of God, otherwise than some Divines have done; against whom he says, he had formerly written a treatise, out of which he repeateth only two things: One is, That we ought not to desert a certain Truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain Manner of it. And I say the same; as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain Truth.—That there are certain and necessary Causes which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what manner the Will of man is caused.—And yet I think the Manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that Praise, Dispraise, Reward and Punishment, Good and Evil Sequels of men's actions retained in Memory, do frame and make us to the Election of whatsoever it be that we elect; and that the Memory of such things proceeds from the Senses; and Sense from the operation of the Objects of sense (which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty); and by consequence all Actions, even of free and voluntary agents, are necessary.

The other thing that he repeateth is,—that the best way to reconcile Contingence and Liberty with Prescience and the Decrees of God, is to subject future contingencies to the Aspect of God.—The same is also
my opinion, but contrary to what his Lordship hath all this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he held *Liberty and Necessity*, that is to say, *Liberty and the Decrees of God*, irreconcileable; unless the *Aspect of God* (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify somewhat else besides *God’s Will* and *Decree*, which I cannot understand.

But he adds, that we must subject them according to that Presentiality which they have in Eternity; which he says cannot be done by them that conceive Eternity to be an everlasting Succession, but only by them that conceive it as an indivisible Point. To which I answer, that as soon as I can conceive Eternity to be an indivisible Point, or any thing but an everlasting Succession, I will renounce all that I have written on this subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls Eternity *Nunc stans*, an *ever-abiding now*; which is easy enough to say; but though I fain would, I never could conceive it; they that can are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save only those that can conceive in their minds a *nunc stans*, which I think are none.

I understand as little how that can be true his Lordship says,—that God is not *just*, but *Justice itself*; not *wise*, but *Wisdom itself*; not *eternal*, but *Eternity itself*;—nor how he concludes thence,—that Eternity is a Point indivisible, and not a Succession;—nor in what sense it can be said,—that an in-
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finite Point, and wherein is no Succession, can comprehend all Time,—though Time be successive. These Phrases I find not in the Scripture; I wonder therefore what was the design of the Schoolmen to bring them up, unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian, unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings.

And thus much for Answer to his Lordship's Discourse; wherein I think not only his Squadrons of Arguments, but also his Reserve of Distinctions are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my Doctrine concerning the same question, with my Reasons for it, positively, and as briefly as I can, without any Terms of Art, in plain English.

My Opinion about Liberty and Necessity.

FIRST I conceive, that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing or abstaining necessarily follows the present thought he hath of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden Anger, the action shall follow the thought of Revenge; in sudden Fear, the thought of
Escape. Also when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the Goodness or Harm of it. These Actions I call Voluntary: my Lord, if I understand him aright, calls them Spontaneous. I call them Voluntary, because those Actions that follow immediately the last Appetite are Voluntary; and here where is one only Appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see'tis reasonable to punish a rash Action; which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were Voluntary. For no Action of a man can be said to be without Deliberation, though never so sudden; because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of Anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death; because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual Deliberation; and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from Election.

Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the Consequences of it both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that Delibera-
tion is nothing else but alternate imagination of the
good and evil Sequels of an Action, or (which is the
same thing) alternate Hope and Fear, or alternate
Appetite to do or quit the action of which he delibe-
rateth.

Thirdly, I conceive that in all Deliberations, that is
to say, in all alternate Succession of contrary Appet-
tites, the last is that which we call the Will, and is
immediately before the doing of the action, or next
before the doing of it become impossible. All other
Appetites to do, and to quit, that come upon a man
during his Deliberation, are called Intentions and
Inclinations, but not Wills; there being but one
Will, which also in this case may be called the last
Will, though the Intentions change often.

Fourthly, I conceive that those Actions, which a
man is said to do upon Deliberation, are said to be
voluntary, and done upon Choice and Election; so
that voluntary Action, and Action proceeding from
Election, are the same thing; and that of a voluntary
Agent, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he
hath not made an end of deliberating.

Fifthly, I conceive Liberty to be rightly defined in
this manner; Liberty is the absence of all the Imped-
diments to action, that are not contained in the Nature
and intrinsical Quality of the Agent: as for exam-
ple, the Water is said to descend freely, or to have
liberty to descend by the channel of the river, be-
because there is no impediment that way; but not across, because the Banks are Impediments. And though the Water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or Power; because the Impediment is in the Nature of the Water, and intrinsic. So also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because the Impediment is not in him, but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the Impediment is in himself.

Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh Beginning from itself, but from the Action of some other immediate Agent without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an Appetite or Will to something, to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will, the Cause of his Will is not the Will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of Voluntary actions the Will is the necessary cause; and by this which is said, the Will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not; it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the Effect. The same is also a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient Cause shall not bring forth the Effect, then there wanteth...
somewhat which was needful to the producing of it; and so the Cause was not sufficient: but if it be impossible that a sufficient Cause should not produce the Effect, then is a sufficient Cause a necessary Cause; for that is said to produce an Effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily: for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient Cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also voluntary Actions are necessitated.

Lastly, I hold, that the ordinary definition of a Free Agent,—namely, *That a free Agent is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the Effect, can nevertheless not produce it,* implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say—*The Cause may be sufficient, that is necessary, and yet the Effect shall not follow.*
My Reasons.

For the first five Points, wherein it is explicated,
1. what Spontaneity is; 2. what Deliberation is;
3. what Will, Propension, and Appetite are;
4. what a free Agent is; 5. what Liberty is; there
   can no other Proof be offered but every man's
   own Experience, by reflection on himself, and re-
   membering what he useth to have in his mind, that is,
   what he himself meaneth, when he saith—an action
   is spontaneous,—a man deliberates,—such is his Will,
   —that Agent or that Action is free.

Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be
satisfied, that Deliberation is the consideration of the
good and evil sequels of an action to come;—that by
Spontaneity is meant inconsiderate action (or else no-
thing is meant by it ;)—that Will is the last act of our
deliberation;—that a free Agent is he that can do if
he will, and forbear if he will;—and that Liberty
is the absence of external impediments.

But, to those that out of custom speak not what
they conceive, but what they hear, and are not
able, or will not take the pains to consider what
they think when they hear such Words, no Argu-
ment can be sufficient; because Experience and
Matter of Fact is not verified by other men's argu-
ments, but by every man's own Sense and Memory. For example; how can it be proved, that to lose a thing, and to think it good, are all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by those words? Or, how can it be proved that Eternity is not Name null to a man that says those words by Custom, and never considers how he can conceive the Thing in his mind?

Also the sixth Point,—that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a Cause,—can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no Cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at one time as another; that is, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times; which is impossible: and therefore he must think there was some special Cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else, that it began never, but was Eternal.

For the seventh Point, which is, that all Events have necessary Causes,—it is there proved, in that they have sufficient Causes. Further, let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing, for example, ambs-ace upon a pair of dice, and see, if it must not have been necessary before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a Beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it; consisting partly in the dice, partly in
outward things, as the posture of the party's hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the table, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular Cast, and consequently the Cast was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the Cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be proved, that every other accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily, which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner: Let the case be put, for example, of the Weather; 'Tis necessary that to-morrow it shall rain, or not rain. If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain; otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, It shall rain, or it shall not rain, should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true, that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly, that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain; which is as much as to say, one of them is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true, determinate, but indeterminate; which Distinction either signifies no more than this—one of them is true, but we know not which;—
and so the Necessity remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning: and they might as well have said, One of them is true Titivice, but neither of them Tē patulice.

The last thing, (in which also consisteth the whole controversy,) namely, that there is no such thing as an Agent, which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it; or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as Freedom from Necessity, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged. For, if it be an Agent, it can work;* and if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action: and consequently the Cause of the Action is sufficient; and if sufficient, then also necessary; as hath been proved before.

And thus you see how the Inconveniences, which his Lordship objecteth must follow upon the holding of Necessity, are avoided; and the Necessity itself demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good Logic, the inconvenience of denying

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* "If it be an agent it can work."—What of this? a posse ad esse non valet argumentum: from can work to will work is a weak inference. Bramhall's Reply.

Here he has gotten a just advantage, for I should have said,—If it be an agent, it worketh, not, it can work. Hobbes's Animadversions.
Necessity; as that it destroyeth both the Decrees and the Presence of God Almighty: for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by Man, as an instrument, or foreseeeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have liberty (such as his Lordship affirmeth) from necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknew it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be, as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question, since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it only to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave, and am,

My most Noble and obliging Lord,

Your most humble Servant,

THOMAS HOBBES.

Rouen, August 20, 1652.
ARGUMENTS seldom work on men of wit and learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion. If anything do it, it is the shewing them the cause of their errors; which is this:—Pious men attribute to God Almighty, for honour's sake, whatsoever they see is honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c. but deny him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither have nor can conceive such Faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then they consider them again as if he had such faculties, and in that manner as we have them: this is not well: and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature: he is no fit subject of our Philosophy. True Religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain.
APPENDIX.

THE Controversy, mentioned at page 118, is become so scarce, that the Editor takes this opportunity of presenting the Reader with a Summary of the contrary Opinions maintained by the Philosopher and the Bishop, in the very words with which Hobbes concludes that work.

"AND now I have done answering to his Arguments, I shall here, in the end of all, take that liberty of censuring his whole book, which he hath taken, in the beginning, of censuring mine.

I have, saith he, Number 1, perused T. H's answers, considered his reasons, and conclude he hath missed and mislaid the question; that his answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, and that the opinion of absolute and universal Necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill-chosen principles.

And now it is my turn to censure.—And first, for the strength of his discourse and knowledge of the point in question, I think it much inferior to that which might have been written by any man living, that had no other learning besides the ability to write
his mind; but as well perhaps as the same man would have done it, if to the ability of writing his mind he had added the study of school-divinity.

Secondly, for the manners of it (for to a public writing there belongeth good manners) it consisteth in railing and exclaiming and scurrilous jesting, with now and then an unclean and mean instance.

And lastly, for his elocution, the virtue whereof lieth not in the flux of words, but in perspicuity, it is the same language with that of the Kingdom of Darkness. One shall find in it, especially where he should speak most closely to the question, such words as these,—divided sense, compounded sense, hypothetical necessity, liberty of exercise, liberty of specification, liberty of contradiction, liberty of contrariety, knowledge of approbation, practical knowledge, general influence, special influence, instinct, qualities infused, efficacious election, moral efficacy, moral motion, metaphorical motion, practicè practicum, motus primo primi, actus eliciti, actus imperati, permissive will, consequent will, negative obduration, deficient cause, simple act, nunc stans, and other like words of nonsense divided, besides many propositions such as these,—The Will is the mistress of human actions, the Understanding is her Counsellor, the Will chooseth, the Will willeth, the Will suspends its own act, the Understanding understandeth, (I wonder how he missed saying, the Understanding suspendeth its own act) the Will applies the Understanding to deliberate, the Will requires of the Understanding a review, the Will determines itself, a change may be willed without changing of the Will, Man concurs
with God in causing his own Will, the Will causeth willing. Motives determine the Will not naturally but morally, the same action may be both future and not future, God is not just but Justice, not eternal but Eternity. Eternity is nunc stans, Eternity is an infinite point which comprehendeth all time not formally but eminently, all Eternity is co-existent with to-day, and the same co-existent with to-morrow; and many other like speeches of nonsense compounded, which the Truth can never stand in need of.

Perhaps the Bishop will say these terms and phrases are intelligible enough: for he has said in his reply to Number 24, that his Opinion is demonstrable in reason, though he be not able to comprehend how it consisteth together with God's eternal Prescience; and though it exceed his weak capacity, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest. So that to him that Truth is manifest, and demonstrable by reason, which is beyond his Capacity: so that Words beyond Capacity are with him intelligible enough.

But the reader is to be judge of that. I could add many other passages that discover both his little Logic (as taking the insignificant Words above recited for Terms of Art) and his no Philosophy, in distinguishing between Moral and Natural motion, and by calling some motions Metaphorical, and by his other offers at the causes of sight, and of the descent of heavy bodies, and his talk of the inclination of the loadstone, and divers other places of his book.

But to make an end, I shall briefly draw up the sum
of what we have both said. That which I have main-
tained is—that no man hath his future Will in his own
present power:—that it may be changed by others,
and by the change of things without him; and when
it is changed, it is not changed nor determined to any
thing by itself; and that when it is undetermined, it
is no Will, because everyone that willeth willeth some-
thing in particular:—that Deliberation is common to
men with beasts, as being alternate appetite, and not
ratiocination; and the last act or appetite therein, and
which is immediately followed by the action, the only
Will that can be taken notice of by others, and which
only maketh an action in public judgment voluntary:
—that to be free is no more than to do, if a man
will, and if he will, to forbear; and consequently that
this freedom is the freedom of the man, and not of the
will:——that the will is not free, but subject to change
by the operation of external causes:——that all exter-
nal causes depend necessarily on the first eternal cause
God Almighty, who worketh in us, both to will and to
do, by the mediation of second Causes:——that seeing
neither man nor any thing else can work upon itself,
it is impossible that any man, in the framing of his own
Will, should concur with God, either as an actor, or as
an instrument:——that there is nothing brought to
pass by Fortune, as by a Cause, nor any thing without
a Cause or concurrence of Causes sufficient to bring it
so to pass; and that every such Cause, and their con-
currence do proceed from the Providence, good pleas-
sure, and working of God: and consequently, though I
do with others, call many events contingent, and say
they Happen, yet because they had every of them their several sufficient Causes, and those Causes again their former Causes, I say they happen necessarily: and though we perceive not what they are, yet there are of the most Contingent events as necessary Causes as of those events whose Causes we perceive; or else they could not possibly be foreknown, as they are by him that fore-knoweth all things.

On the contrary, the Bishop maintaineth—that the Will is free from Necessitation, and in order thereto that the judgment of the Understanding is not always practicé practicum, nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige and determine the Will to one; though it be true that Spontaneity and Determination to one may consist together:—that the Will determineth itself; and that external things, when they change the Will, do work upon it not naturally but morally, not by natural motion but by moral and metaphysical motion:—that when the Will is determined naturally, it is not by God's general influence, whereon depend all second Causes, but by special influence; God concurring, and pouring something into the Will:—that the Will, when it suspends not its act, makes the act necessary; but because it may suspend and not assent it is not absolutely necessary:—that sinful acts proceed not from God's Will; but are willed by him by a Permissive Will, not an Operative Will; and he hardeneth the heart of man by a negative obduration:—that man's Will is in his own power; but his motus primo primo not in his own power, nor necessary, save only by a hypothetical necessity:—that the will
APPENDIX.

to change is not always a change of Will:—that not all things which are produced are produced from Sufficient, but some from Deficient Causes:—that if the power of the Will be present in actu primo, then there is nothing wanting to the production of the effect:—that a Cause may be sufficient for the production of an effect, though it want something necessary to the production thereof, because the Will may be wanting:—that a necessary Cause doth not always necessarily produce its effect, but only then when the effect is necessarily produced. He proveth also that the Will is free, by that universal notion which the world hath of Election; for when of the six electors the votes are divided equally, the King of Bohemia hath a casting voice:—that the Prescience of God supposeth no necessity of the future existence of the things foreknown; because God is not eternal but Eternity; and Eternity is a standing Now, without succession of time; and therefore God sees all things intuitively by the presentiality they have in nunc stans, which comprehendeth in it all time, past, present, and to come, not formally, but eminently and virtually:—that the Will is free even then when it acteth; but that is in a compounded, not in a divided sense:—that to be made and to be eternal do consist together, because God's decrees are made, and are nevertheless eternal:—that the order, beauty, and perfection of the World doth require that in the universe there should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent:—that though it be true that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain, yet
neither of them is true determinate:—that the doctrine of Necessity is a blasphemous, desperate, and destructive doctrine:—that it were better to be an Atheist than to hold it; and he that maintaineth it is fitter to be refuted with rods than with arguments.

And now whether this his doctrine or mine be the more intelligible, more rational, or more conformable to God's word, I leave it to the judgment of the reader. But whatsoever be the truth of the disputed question, the reader may peradventure think I have not used the Bishop with that respect I ought, or without disadvantage of my cause I might have done: for which I am to make a short apology.

A little before the last Parliament of the late King, when every man spake freely against the then present government, I thought it worth my study to consider the grounds and consequences of such behaviour, and whether it were conformable or contrary to Reason and to the word of God. And after some time, I did put in order and publish my thoughts thereof, first in Latin, and then again the same in English;* where I endeavoured to prove, both by reason and scripture, that they who have once submitted themselves to any sovereign governour, either by express acknowledgment of his power, or by receiving protection from his laws, are obliged to be true and faithful to him, and to acknowledge no other supreme power but him in any matter or question what-

soever, either civil or ecclesiastical. In which books of mine I pursued my subject, without taking notice of any particular man that held any opinion contrary to that which I then writ: only in general I maintained that the office of the Clergy, in respect of the Supreme Civil Power, was not Magisterial but Ministerial; and that their teaching of the people was founded upon no other authority than that of the Civil Sovereign: and all this without any word tending to the disgrace either of Episcopacy or of Presbytery.

Nevertheless, I find since that divers of them, whereof the Bishop of Derry is one, have taken offence especially at two things—one, that I make the Supremacy in matters of Religion to reside in the Civil Sovereign; the other that being no Clergyman I deliver doctrines, and ground them upon words of the Scripture, which doctrines they being by profession Divines have never taught. And in this their displeasure, divers of them in their books and sermons, without answering any of my arguments, have not only exclaimed against my doctrine, but reviled me, and endeavoured to make me hateful for those things, for which (if they knew their own and the public good) they ought to have given me thanks. There is also one of them, that taking offence at me, for blaming in part the discipline instituted heretofore, and regulated by the authority of the Pope in the Universities, not only ranks me amongst those men that would have the revenue of the Universités diminished, and says plainly I have no Religion, but
also thinks me so simple and ignorant of the world as to believe that our Universities maintain Popery: and this is the author of the book called *Vindiciae Academi- arum*. If either of the Universities had thought itself injured, I believe it could have authorized or appointed some member of theirs, (whereof there be many abler men than he) to have made their Vindication. But this *Vindex*, (as little dogs, to please their masters, use to bark, in token of their sedulity, indifferently at strangers, till they be rated off) unprovoked by me, hath fallen upon me without bidding. I have been publicly injured by many of whom I took no notice; supposing that that humour would spend itself: but seeing it last, and grow higher in this writing I now answer, I thought it necessary at last to make of some of them, and first of this Bishop, an example."
SUPPLEMENT,

Containing such Extracts from Hobbes' animadversions on Dr. Bramhall's reply to the foregoing Treatise, as may serve to explain the more difficult and disputed points in the Controversy; to elucidate some obscure questions in Theology and Metaphysics, and to illustrate the Doctrines of the Philosopher of Malmesbury.

When the argument of the Bishop is not involved in the answer of his Antagonist, his Reply is quoted in distinct clauses, marked by inverted commas.

Whether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from Necessity, or some things from Chance, has been a question disputed amongst the old Philosophers long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, without drawing into argument on either side the almighty power of the Deity.

But the third way of bringing things to pass distinct from Necessity and Chance, namely Freewill, is a thing that never was mentioned amongst them, nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity: for St. Paul, that disputes that question largely and purposely, never useth the term Freewill; nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to that which is now called the doctrine of Freewill; but deriveth all actions from the irresistible will of God, and nothing from the will of him that runneth or willeth.

But for some ages past, the Doctors of the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of God's Will the will of Man; and brought in a doctrine that not only Man, but also his Will is free, and determined to this or that action, not by the Will of God, nor necessary Causes, but by the power of the Will
itself. And though by the reformed Churches, instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, this opinion was cast out, yet not many years since it began again to be reduced by Arminius and his followers, and became the readiest way to ecclesiastical promotion; and by discontenting those that held the contrary, was in some part the cause of the following troubles; which troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at Paris, where we discoursed together of the Argument now in hand; from which discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion, and for aught I remember, without any offensive words, as Blasphemous, Atheistical, or the like, passing between us; either for that the Bishop was not then in a passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in the presence of my Lord of Newcastle. page 1 and 2.

For the arguments derived from the Attributes of God, so far forth as those arguments are argumentative, that is, so far forth as their Significations be conceivable, I admit them for Arguments; but where they are given for honour only, and signify nothing but an intention and endeavour to praise and magnify as much as we can Almighty God, there I hold them not for Arguments, but for Oblations, not for the Language, but (as the Scripture calls them) for the Calves of our lips; which signify not true nor false, or any Opinion of our brain, but the Reverence and Devotion of our hearts: and therefore they are no sufficient premises to infer Truth, or convince Falsehood, page 5.

It is no extraordinary kind of language to call Commandments and Exhortations, and other Significations of the Will by the name of Will; though the Will be an internal act of the Soul, and Commands are but Words and Signs external of that internal Act. So that the Will and the Word are diverse things; and differ as the thing signified and the Sign. And hence it comes to pass that the Word and Commandment of God, namely, the holy Scripture, is usually called by Christians not God's Will, but his Revealed Will; acknowledging the Very Will of God,
which they call his Counsel and Decree, to be another thing: for the revealed will of God to Abraham was that Isaac should be sacrificed; but it was his will that he should not: and his revealed will to Jonas that Nineveh should be destroyed within forty days, but not his decree and purpose. His Decree and Purpose cannot be known beforehand, but may afterwards by the Event; for from the event we may infer his Will; but his Revealed Will, which is his Word, must be foreknown, because it ought to be the rule of our Actions. page 10.

But what shall we answer to the words in Ecclesiasticus—"Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away; say not thou, he hath caused me to err."—If it had not been say not thou, but think not thou, I should have answered that Ecclesiasticus is Apocrypha, and merely human authority. But it is very true that such words as these are not to be said; first, because St. Paul forbids it—"Shall the thing formed (saith he) say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me so?"—Yet true it is that he did so make him. Secondly, because we ought to attribute nothing to God but what we conceive to be honourable, (and we judge nothing honourable but what we count so among ourselves,) and because accusation of man is not honourable, therefore such words are not to be used concerning God Almighty. And for the same cause it is not lawful to say that any action can be done, which God hath purposed shall not be done: for it is a token of want of power to hinder it. Therefore neither of them is to be said, though one of them must needs be true. Thus you see how disputing of God's nature, which is incomprehensible, driveth men upon one of these two rocks. And this was the Cause I was unwilling to have my answer to the Bishop's doctrine of Liberty published. pages 11 and 12.

But though God have power to afflict a man, and not for sin, without injustice, shall we think God so cruel as to afflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless torment? Is it not
Cruelty? No more than to do the same for sin, when he that so afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning. But what infallible evidence hath the Bishop that a man shall be after this life eternally in torments, and never die? Or how is it certain there is no second death, when the Scripture saith there is? Or where doth the Scripture say that a second death is an endless life? Or do the Doctors only say it? Then perhaps they do but say so, and for reasons best known to themselves. There is no injustice nor cruelty in him that giveth life, to give it with sickness, pain, torments, and death: nor in him that giveth life twice, to give the same miseries twice also. page 13.

I find in those that write of this Argument (especially in the schoolmen and their followers) so many words strangers to our language, and such confusion and inanity in the ranging of them, as that a man's mind in the reading of them distinguisheth nothing: and as things were in the beginning (before the spirit of God was moved upon the abyss) Tehu and Bohu, that is to say, confusion and emptiness, so are their discourses. page 15.

Necessary is that which is impossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot possibly otherwise come to pass. Therefore Necessary, Possible, and Impossible have no signification in reference to time past, or time present, but only time to come. page 26.

For Contingent, he understandeth not what it meaneth: for it is all one to say—It is contingent, and simply to say, It is;—saying that when they say simply, It is, they consider not how or by what means; but in saying, It is Contingent, they tell us they know not whether necessarily or not. But the Bishop thinking Contingent to be that which is not necessary, instead of arguing against our knowledge of the Necessity of things to come, argueth against the Necessity itself. page 37.

After his Arguments come his difficult questions.—"If the will of man be determined without his will, or without any thing in his power, why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not?"—I answer, because we desire to know; and can-
not know but by their telling, nor then neither for the most part.

"Why do we represent reasons to them; why do we pray them; why do we entreat them?" I answer, because they please us not. I might ask him whether blaming be any thing else but saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect. May not we say a horse is lame, though his lameness came from Necessity; or that a man is a fool or knave, if he be so, though he could not help it?

—&c.— Is not good good, and evil evil, though they be not in our power; and shall not I call them so, and is not that Praise and Blame? But it seems the Bishop takes Blame not for the dispraise of a thing, but for a pretext and colour of malice and revenge against him he blameth. And where he says, our Wills are in our power, he sees not that he speaks absurdly; for he ought to say, the Will is the Power; and through ignorance detecteth not the same fault in St. Austin; who saith, "our Will would not be a Will at all, if it were not in our power," that is to say, if it were not in our Will.

"This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature," &c.

This piece of eloquence is used by Cicero in his defence of Milo, to prove it lawful for a man to resist force with force, or to keep himself from killing: which the Bishop (thinking himself able to make that which proves one thing prove any thing) hath translated into English, and brought into this place to prove Free-Will. It is true, very few have learned from tutors, that a man is not free to will; nor do they find it much in books. That they find in books, that which the Poets chant in the theatres, and the Shepherds on the mountains, that which the Pastors teach in the churches, and the Doctors in the universities, and that which the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto, is the same that I assent unto, namely, that a man hath freedom to do if he will; but whether he hath freedom to will, is a question which it seems neither the Bishop nor they ever thought on. p. 39, 49.
A wooden top that is lashed by the boys, and runs about, sometimes to one wall, sometimes to another, sometimes spinning, sometimes hitting men on the shins, if it were sensible of its own motion, would think it proceeded from its own will, unless it felt what lashed it. And is a man any wiser, when he runs to one place for a benefice, to another for a bargain, and troubles the world with writing errors, and requiring answers, because he thinks he does it without other cause than his own will, and seeth not what are the lashings that cause his will? page 41.

The Bishop tells us that Liberty is sometimes opposed to Sin, to Oppression, to Servitude: which is to tell us that they whom he hath read in this point are inconstant in the meaning of their own words; and therefore they are little beholding to him. And this diversity of Significations he calls Distinctions. Do men that by the same word in one place mean one thing, and in another another, and never tell us so, distinguish? I think they rather confound,—&c.—Also he will face me down that I understand what he means by his distinctions of Liberty of Contrariety, of Contradiction, of exercise only, of exercise and specification jointly. If he mean I understand his meaning, in one sense it is true: for by them he means to shift off the discredit of being able to say nothing to the question; as they do, that pretending to know the cause of every thing, give for the cause why the Loadstone draweth to it Iron, Sympathy and occult quality, making they cannot tell (turned now into occult) to stand for the real cause of that most admirable effect. But that these words signify distinction, I constantly deny. It is not enough for a distinction to be forked, it ought to signify a distinct Conception—

"It is strange to see with what confidence now-a-days particular men slight all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers, and Classic authors of former ages," &c.

This word particular men is put here in my opinion with little judgment, especially by a man that pretendeth to be learned. Does the Bishop think that he himself is, or that there is any
universal man? It may be he means a private man. Does he then think there is any man not private, besides him that is endued with sovereign power? But it is most likely he calls me a particular man, because I have not had the authority he has had to teach what doctrine I think fit. But now, I am no more particular than he; and may with as good a grace despise the Schoolmen, and some of the old Philosophers, as he can despise me; unless he can shew that it is more likely that he should be better able to look into these questions sufficiently, which require meditation and reflection upon a man's own thoughts, (he, that hath been obliged most of his time to preach unto the people, and to that end to read those authors that can best furnish him with what he has to say, and to study for the rhetoric of his expressions, and of the spare time, which to a good pastor is very little, hath spent no little part in seeking preterment and increasing of riches,) than I that have done almost nothing else, nor have had much else to do, but to meditate upon this and other natural questions. p. 46, 47.

"I cannot but observe that there is not one word of Art in this whole treatise, which he useth in the right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers," &c.

He might have said, there is not a word of Jargon, nor Nonsense; and that it proceedeth from an affectation of Truth, and Contempt of Metaphysical Writers, and a desire to reduce into frame the Learning which they have confounded and disordered. page 59.

In his reply, number 3, he saith, that "for the clearing of the question, we are to know the difference between these three, Necessity, Spontaneity, and Liberty:" and because I thought he knew that it could not be cleared without understanding what is Will, I had reason to think that Spontaneity was his new word for Will. And presently after, "Some things are necessary, and not voluntary or spontaneous; some things are both necessary and voluntary." These words Voluntary and Spontaneous so put
together would make any man believe Spontaneous were put as explicative of Voluntary: for it is no wonder in the con-
sequence of the Schoolmen. Therefore presently after, these words
"Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the Appetite, either
intellectual or sensitive, to the Object," signify that Sponta-
neity is a conformity or likeness of the Appetite to the Ob-
ject; which to me soundeth as if he had said, that the Appetite
is like the Object; which is as proper as if he had said the
Hunger is like the Meat. If this be the Bishop's meaning, as it
is the meaning of the words, he is a very fine Philosopher. But
hereafter I will venture no more to say his meaning is this or
that; especially where he useth terms of Art.

"Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe Spontaneity only to fools, chil-
dren, madmen, and beasts. But I acknowledge Spontaneity
hath place in rational men," &c.

I resolve to have no more to do with Spontaneity: but I de-
sire the Reader to take notice that the Common people (on
whose arbitration dependeth the Signification of words in Com-
mon use) among the Latins and Greeks did call all actions and
motions, whereof they did perceive no cause; Spontaneous and
autogwvata; I say not, those actions which had no causes, (for all
actions have their Causes) but those actions whose causes they
did not perceive. So that Spontaneous, as a general name, com-
prehended many actions and motions of inanimate creatures; as
the falling of heavy things downwards, which they thought sponta-
neous, and that if they were not hindered, they would descend
of their own accord. It comprehended also all animal motion,
as beginning from the Will or Appetite; because the Causes of
the Will and Appetite being not perceived, they supposed, as the
Bishop doth, that they were the Causes of themselves; so that
that which in general is called Spontaneous, being applied to
men and beasts in special, is called Voluntary. Yet the Will and
Appetite, though the very same thing, use to be distinguished in
certain occasions; for in the public Conversation of men, where
they are to judge of one another's Will; and of the regularity and irregularity of one another's actions, not every appetite, but the best is esteemed in the public judgment for the Will; nor every action proceeding from Appetite, but that only to which there had preceded, or ought to have preceded some Deliberation. And this I say is so; when one man is to judge of another's will: for every man in himself knoweth that what he desireth, or hath an appetite to, the same he hath a will to; though his Will may be changed before he hath obtained his Desire. page 70, 71.

Another Contradiction which he finds is this, that having undertaken to prove that Children, before they have the use of reason, do deliberate and elect, I say by and by after—a child may be so young as to do what he doth without all deliberation.—I yet see no contradiction here; for a child may be so young as that the appetite thereof is its first appetite; but afterward, and often before it come to have the use of reason, may elect one thing and refuse another, and consider the Consequences of what it is about to do. And why not as well as beasts, which never have the use of reason? for they deliberate as men do: for though men and beasts do differ in many things very much, yet they differ not in the nature of their deliberation. A man can reckon by words of general signification; make propositions and syllogisms, and compute in numbers; magnitudes, and proportions, and other things computable; which being done by the advantage of language, and words of general signification, a beast that hath not language cannot do, nor a man that hath language, if he misplace the words that are his counters.

He would have men believe that because I hold Necessity, I deny Liberty. I hold as much that there is True Liberty as he doth; and more, for I hold it as from Necessity, and that there must of necessity be Liberty; but he holds it not from necessity, and so makes it possible there may be none. page 77.

The Protestant Doctors both of our and other Churches did
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It seemeth that all they that hold this freedom of the Will, conceive of God no otherwise than the common sort of Jews did,—that God was like a man, that he had been seen by Moses, and after by the seventy elders, Exod. 9, 10. expounding that and other places literally. Again he saith that God is said to harden the heart permissively, but not operatively, which is the same distinction with his first, namely, negatively, not positively, and with his second, occasionally and not casually: so that all his three ways, how God hardens the heart of wicked men, come to this one of permission; which is as much as to say, God sees, looks on, and doeth nothing, nor ever did any thing in the business. page 106.

"T. H. demands how God should be the Cause of the action, and yet not be the Cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because he consents to the doing of evil, by a general, but not by a special influence."

I had thought to pass over this place, because of the nonsense of general and special influence. Seeing he saith that God consents to the doing of evil, I desire the Reader would take notice, that if he blame me for speaking of God as of a necessitating Cause, and as it were a principal agent in the causing of all actions, he may with as good reason blame himself for making him by con- surrence an accessory to the same: and indeed, let men hold what they will contrary to the Truth, if they write much, the Truth will fall into their peas.


But he thinks he hath a similitude, which will make this permissive will a very clear business.—The Earth (saith he) gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to Hemlock as to Wheat: but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the general nourishment of the Earth, but from the special quality of the Root. It seemeth by this similitude he thinketh that God doth, not operatively, but permissively, will that the root of Hemlock should poison the man that eateth it; but that Wheat should nourish him, he willeth Operatively: which is very absurd; or else he must confess that the venomous effects of wicked men are willed operatively. page 107.

"The general power (saith he) to act is from God; but the specification to do this act upon Uriah is not from God, but from Free-Will.—Very learnedly: As if there were a power, that were not the power to do some particular act; or a power to kill, and yet to kill nobody in particular. If the power be to kill, it is to kill that which shall be by that power killed, whether it be Uriah or any other; and the giving of that power is the application of it to the act: nor doth power signify any thing actually, but those motions and present acts from which the act that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily proceedeth. page 108.

"But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make Justice to be the proper result of Power."

He would make men believe that I hold all things to be just, that are done by them who have power enough to avoid the punishment. This is one of his pretty little policies, by which I find him in many occasions to take the measure of his own Wisdom. I said no more but that the Power which is absolutely irresistible makes him that hath it above all Law; so that nothing he doth can be Unjust: but this power can be no other than the Power Divine, &c.

I think there is no man but understands, no, not the Bishop
himself, but that where two things are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude, regularity or irregularity that is between them, is made in and by the making of the things themselves that are compared. The Bishop therefore that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies him to be the cause both of the Law and of the Action. So that by his doctrine, there shall be a good Law, whereof God shall be no cause, and an Action, that is a local motion, that shall depend upon another first mover that is not God. page 111.

Those laws (he saith) are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible to be done, and punish men for not doing of them.—In which words this is one absurdity, that a Law can be unjust; for all Laws are Divine or Civil: neither of which can be unjust. Of the first there is no doubt: and as for Civil Laws, they are made by every man that is subject to them; because every one of them consenteth to the placing of the Legislative power. Another is this, in the same words; that he supposeth there may be Laws that are tyrannical; for if he that maketh them have the sovereign power, they may be Regal, but not Tyrannical; if Tyrant signify not King, as he thinks it doth not. Another is in the same words, that a Law may prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done. When he says impossible in themselves, he understands not what himself means. Impossible in themselves are contradictions only, as to be and not to be at the same time, which the Divines say, is not possible to God. All other things are possible, at least in themselves. Raising from the dead, changing the course of nature, making of a new heaven and a new earth, are things possible in themselves; for there is nothing in their nature able to resist the Will of God; and if Laws do not prescribe such things, why should I believe they prescribe other things that are more impossible, &c. &c.

He further says, that Just Laws are the ordinances of right Reason,—which is an error that hath cost many thousands of men
their lives. Was there never King that made a Law, which in right reason had been better unmade? and shall these Laws therefore not be obeyed? shall we rather rebel? I think not, though I am not so great a Divine as he. I think rather that the Reason of him that hath the Sovereign authority, and by whose sword we look to be protected both against war from abroad and injuries at home, whether it be right or erroneous in itself, ought to stand for Right to us, that have submitted ourselves thereunto by receiving the protection.

But the Bishop putteth his greatest confidence in this,—that whether the things be impossible in themselves, or made impossible by some unseen accident, yet there is no reason that men should be punished for not doing them.—It seems, he taketh Punishment for a kind of Revenge; and can never therefore agree with me, that take it for nothing else but for a Correction, or for an Example, which, hath for end the framing and necessitating of the Will to virtue; and that he is no good man, that upon any provocation useth his power (though a power lawfully obtained) to afflict another man without this end,—to reform the Will of him or others. Nor can I comprehend (as having only human ideas) that that punishment, which neither intendeth the Correction of the offender, nor the Correction of others by example, doth proceed from God.

"He saith that no Law can possibly be unjust," &c.—Against this he replies that the Law of Pharaoh, to drown the male children of the Israelites; and of Nebuchadnezzar, to worship the golden image; and of Darius, against praying to any but him in thirty days; and of Ahasuerus, to destroy the Jews; and of the Pharisees, to excommunicate the Confessors of Christ; were all unjust Laws. The Laws of those Kings, as they were Laws, have relation only to the men that were their subjects; and the making of them, which was the action of every one of those kings, who were subjects to another King, namely, to God Almighty, had relation to the Law of God. In the first relation,
there could be no injustice in them; because all Laws made by him to whom the people had given the legislative power, are the acts of every one of that people; and no man can do injustice to himself. But in relation to God, if God have by a Law forbidden it, the making of such laws is injustice: which Law of God was to those heathen princes no other but Salus populi, that is to say, the properest use of their natural reason, for the preservation of their subjects. If therefore these Laws were ordained out of wantonness, or cruelty, or envy, or for the pleasing of a favourite, or out of any other sinister end, as it seems they were, the making of those Laws was unjust. But if in right reason they were necessary for the preservation of those people of whom they had undertaken the charge, then was it not unjust, &c.

"The ground of this error, &c. is this,—that every man makes by his Consent the Law which he is bound to keep," &c.

The reason why he thinketh this an error is—because the positive Law of God contained in the Bible is a Law without our assent: the Law of Nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God without our assent: the Laws of Conquerors who came in by the power of the sword were made without our assent: and so were the Laws of our ancestors, which were made before we were born.

It is a strange thing, that he that understands the nonsense of the Schoolmen should not be able to perceive so easy a truth as this which he denieth. The Bible is a Law: to whom? to all the world? He knows it is not. How came it then to be a Law to us? did God speak it sine vice to us? have we then any other warrant for it than the word of the prophets? have we seen the miracles? have we any other assurance of their certainty than the authority of the church, and is the authority of the church any other than the authority of the Commonwealth; or that of the Commonwealth any other than that of the head of the Commonwealth; or hath the head of the Commonwealth any other authority than that which hath been given him by the
members? else why should not the Bible be canonical as well in Constantinople as in any other place? They that have the Legislative power make nothing Canon which they make not Law; nor Law, which they make not Canon; and because the Legislative power is from the assent of the Subjects, the Bible is made Law by the assent of the Subjects. It was not the Bishop of Rome that made the Scripture Law without his own temporal dominions: nor is it the Clergy that make it Law in their dioceses and rectories: nor can it be a Law of itself without special and supernatural Revelation. The Bishop thinks, because the Bible is Law, and he is appointed to teach it to the people in his diocese, that therefore it is Law to whomsoever he teach it: which is somewhat gross; but not so gross as to say, that Conquerors who come in by the power of the sword, make their Laws also without our assent. He thinks be like that if a Conqueror can kill me if he please, I am presently obliged without more ado to obey all his Laws. May not I rather die, if I think fit? The Conqueror makes no law over the conquered by virtue of his power, but by virtue of their assent that promised obedience for the saving of their lives. But how then is the assent of the Children obtained to the Laws of their ancestors? This also is from the desire of preserving their lives; which first the Parents might take away, where the parents be free from all subjection; and where they are not, there the Civil Power might do the same, if they doubted of their obedience. The Children, therefore, when they be grown up to strength enough to do mischief, and to judgment enough to know that other men are kept from doing mischief to them by fear of the sword that protecteth them, in that very act of receiving that protection, and not renouncing it openly, do oblige themselves to obey the Laws of their protectors, to which, in receiving such protection, they have assented. And whereas he saith,—the Law of Nature is a Law without our assent,—it is absurd; for the Law of Nature is
the Assent itself that all men give to the means of their own pre-
servation. page 133 to 7.

How would he have been offended, if I had said of Man as
Pliny doth—Quo nillum est animal neque miserius, neque su-
perbus. The truth is that Man is a creature of greater power
than other living creatures are: but his advantages do consist
especially in two things; whereof one is the Use of Speech, by
which men communicate one with another, and join their forces
together; and by which also they register their thoughts, that
they perish not, but be preserved, and afterwards joined with
other thoughts, to produce general rules for the direction of
their actions. There be beasts that see better, others that hear
better, and others that exceed mankind in other senses. Man
excelleth Beasts only in making of Rules to himself, that is to
say in remembering and in reasoning aright upon that which he
remembereth. They which do so deserve an honour above brute
beasts; but they, which mistaking the use of words, deceive them-
selves and others, introducing error, and seducing men from the
truth, are so much less to be honoured than brute beasts, as Error is
more vile than Ignorance. So that it is not merely the nature of
Man that makes him worthier than other living creatures, but the
knowledge that he acquires by meditation, and by the right use
of reason in making good rules of his future actions. The other
advantage a man hath, is the Use of his Hands, for the making
of those things which are instrumental to his well-being. p. 141.

Free, Contingent, and Necessary, are not words that can be
joined to Means or Ends, but to Agents and Actions, that is to
say, to things that move or are moved. A Free Agent being
that whose motion or action is not hindered nor stopt: and a
Free Action, that which is produced by a free agent. A Contingent
Agent is the same with an Agent simply. But because men
for the most part think those things are produced without a
Cause, whereof they do not see the Cause, they use to call both
the Agent and the Action contingent, as attributing it to Fortune. And therefore when the Causes are necessary, if they perceive not the Necessity, they call those Necessary agents and actions, in things that have appetite, free; and in things insani-
mate, contingent. page 143.

Good is relative to those that are pleased with it: and not of absolute signification to all men. God therefore said that all that he had made was very good; because he was pleased with the Creatures of his own making. But if all things were absolutely good, we should be all pleased with their Being; which we are not when the actions that depend upon their Being are hurtful to us. And therefore, to speak properly, nothing is Good or Evil, but in regard of the action that proceedeth from it, and also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt. Satan is evil to us, because he seeketh our destruction; but good to God, because he executeth his Commandments, &c. &c.

And whereas I had said that to say a thing is Good, is to say, it is as I or another would wish, or as the state would have it, or according to the Law of the Land,—he answers that I mistake infinitely. And his reason is, because we often wish what is profitable or delightful, without regarding as we ought what is honest.—There is no man living that seeth all the Consequences of an action from the beginning to the end, whereby to weigh the whole sum of the good with the whole sum of the evil Con-
sequences. We choose no further than we can weigh. That is
good to every man which is so far good as he can see. All the
real good, which we call Honest and Morally virtuous, is that
which is not repugnant to the Law, Civil or Natural: for the Law
is all the right reason we have; and though he, as often as it dis-
agreeeth with his own reason, deny it, is the infallible rule of
Moral goodness. The reason whereof is this; that because nei-
ther mine nor the Bishop's reason is right reason, fit to be a
rule of our moral actions, we have therefore set up over our-
selves a sovereign governour, and agreed that his Laws shall be
unto us, whatsoever they be, in the place of right reason, to dictate to us what is really good; in the same manner as men in playing turn-up Trump; and as in playing their Game, their Morality consisteth in not renouncing, so in our Civil Conversation, our Morality is all contained in not disobeying of the Law.

page 145, 6, 7.

"When brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is not out of judgment, or deliberation, or discourse, by inferring or concluding one thing from another, which they are not capable of. Neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do, but merely out of memory, or out of a sensitive fear or hope. They remember that when they did after one manner, they were beaten, and when they did after another manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply themselves."

If the Bishop had considered the cogitations of his own mind, not then when he disputeth, but then when he followed those businesses which he calleth Trifles, he would have found them the very same which he here mentioneth; saving, instead of besting (because he is exempt from that) he is to put in damage. For setting aside the discourse of the tongue, in words of general signification, the ideas of our minds are the same with those of other living creatures, created from visible, audible, and other sensible objects to the eyes and other organs of sense, as theirs are. For as the objects of sense are all individual, that is, singular, so are all the fancies proceeding from their operations; and men reason not but in words of universal signification, uttered or tacitly thought on. page 149.

"First, he errs in making inward piety to consist morally in the estimation of the judgment. If this were so, what wonder but that the Devils should have as much inward Piety as the best Christians? for they esteem God's power to be infinite, and tremble."

I said that two things concerned to Piety: one, to esteem his power as highly as impossible; the other, that we signify that as-
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Supposition by our words and actions, that is to say, that we worship him: This latter part of Piety he leaveth out; and then it is much more easy to conclude as he doth, that the Devils may have inward piety. But neither doth the Conclusion follow: for Goodness is one of God's powers, (namely, that Power by which he worketh in men the Hope they have in him) and is relative: and therefore unless the Devil think that God will be good to him, he cannot esteem him for his goodness. It does not therefore follow from any opinion of mine, that the Devil may have as much inward piety as a Christian. But how does the Bishop know how the Devils esteem God's power? and what Devils does he mean? There are in the Scripture two sorts of things which are in English translated Devils; one is that which is called Satan, Dæmonia, and Abaddon, which signifies in English an Enemy, an Accuser, and a Destroyer of the Church of God: in which sense the Devils are but wicked men. How then is he sure that they esteem God's power to be infinite? For Trembling infers no more than that they apprehend it to be greater than their own. The other sort of Devils are called in the Scripture Dæmonia, which are the feigned Gods of the Heathen, and are neither bodies nor spiritual substances, but mere fancies and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned by the Greeks and other heathen people; and which St. Paul calleth Nothing; for an Idol, saith he, is Nothing; &c. &c. He speaketh of God's Goodness and Mercy, as if they were no part of his Power. Is not Goodness in him that is good the Power to make himself beloved; and is not Mercy Goodness? Are not therefore these Attributes contained in the Attribute of his Omnipotence; and Justice in God, is it any thing else but the Power he hath and exerciseth in distributing blessings and afflictions? Justice is not in God as in man, the observation of the Laws made by his Superiors; nor is Wisdom in God: a logical examination of the means by the end, as it is in men; but an incomprehensible Attribute given to an incomprehensible Nature, for to honour him. It is
the Bishop that errs, in thinking nothing to be Power but Riches and High place, wherein to domineer and please himself; and vex those that submit not to his Opinions. page 159, 160, 161.

N.B. There is a skip in the paging from 161 to 174.

"Observe what a description he hath given us here of Repentance:—It is a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way.—It amazed me to find gladness to be the first word in the description of Repentance."

I could never be of opinion that Christian repentance could be ascribed to them that had as yet no intention to forsake their sins, and to lead a new life. He that grieves for the evil that hath happened to him for his sins, but hath not a resolution to obey God's commandments better for the time to come, grieveth for his sufferings, but not for his doings; which no Divine, I think, will call Christian repentance: but he that resolveth upon amendment of life, knoweth that there is forgiveness for him in Christ Jesus, whereof a Christian cannot possibly be but glad: Before this Gladness there was a grief preparative to Repentance; but the Repentance itself was not Christian repentance, till this Conversion, till this glad Conversion. Therefore I see no reason why it should amaze him to find Gladness to be the first word in the description of Repentance, saving that the Light amazeth such as have been long in Darkness. And for the Fasting, Sackcloth, and Ashes, they were never parts of Repentance perfected, but signs of the beginning of it. They are external things: Repentance is internal. This doctrine pertaineth to the establishing of Romish penances; and being found to conduce to the power of the Clergy, was by them wished to be restored. page 177.

"This Opinion makes Sin to proceed essentially, by way of physical determination, from the first Cause. But whatsoever proceeds essentially, by way of physical determination, from the first Cause, is Good and Just and Lawful. Therefore this Opi-
nion of Necessity maketh Sin to be very Good, Just, and Lawful."

He might as well have concluded,—Whatever man hath been made by God is a good and just man. He observeth not that Sin is not a thing really made. Those things which at first were actions were not then Sins, though actions of the same nature with those which were afterwards Sins: nor was then the Will to any thing a sin, though it were a will to the same thing which in willing now we should sin. Actions became Sins then first when the Commandment came: for as St. Paul saith, Without the Law, Sin is dead; and Sin being but a transgression of the Law, there can be no action made sin but by the Law. Therefore this Opinion, though it derive Actions essentially from God, it derives not Sins essentially from him, but relatively, and by the Commandment. And consequently, the Opinion of Necessity taketh not away the nature of Sin, but necessitateth that action which the Law hath made Sin. page 189.

I say not—the Law enjoineth things impossible in themselves: for so I should say it enjoined contradictories. But I say, the Law sometimes (the Law-makers not knowing the secret necessities of things to come) enjoineth things made impossible by secret and extrinsical causes from all eternity. From this his error he infers that the Laws must be unjust and tyrannical, and the transgression of them no sin. But he who holds that Laws can be unjust and tyrannical, will easily find pretence enough, under any government in the world, to deny obedience to the Laws, unless they be such as he himself maketh, or adviseth to be made. He says also,—that I suppose the Will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause. It is true, saving that senseless word influence, which I never used. But his consequence,—then it is not man's will, but God's will,—is not true: for it may be the will both of one and of the other; and yet not by concurrence, as in a league, but by subjection of the will of man to the will of God. page 190.
The Bishop supposing I had taken my Opinion from the authority of the Stoic Philosophers, not from my own meditation, falleth into dispute against the Stoics; whereof I might, if I pleased, take no notice, but pass over to Number 19. But that he may know I have considered their doctrine concerning Fate, I think fit to say thus much—that their error consisteth not in the opinion of Fate, but in the feigning of a false God. When therefore they say, Fatum est effatum Jovis, they say no more, but that Fate is the word of Jupiter. If they had said it had been the word of the true God, I should not have perceived any thing in it to contradict: because I hold, as most Christians do, that the whole world was made, and is now governed by the Word of God, which bringeth a necessity of all things and actions to depend upon the divine disposition. Nor do I see cause to find fault with that (as he does) which is said by Lipsius,—that Fate is a series or order of causes depending upon the divine counsel—"though the Divines thought he came too near them," as he thinks I do now. And the reason why "he was cautious," was because, being a member of the Romish Church, he had little confidence in the judgment and lenity of the Romish Clergy; and not because he thought he had "overshot himself," page 197.

He approveth my modesty in suspending my judgment concerning the manner how the good Angels do work,—necessarily or freely—because I find it not set down in the Articles of our Faith, nor in the decrees of our Church. But he useth not the same modesty himself; for whereas he can apprehend neither the nature of God nor of Angels, nor conceive what kind of thing it is which in them he calleth Will, he nevertheless takes upon him to attribute to them, liberty of exercise, and to deny them a liberty of specification, to grant them a more intensive liberty than we have, but not a more extensive; using not incongruously in the incomprehensibility of the subject incomprehensible terms, as Liberty of Exercise, and Liberty of Specification, and degrees of intension in Liber-
ty; as if one Liberty, like Heat, might be more intensive than another. It is true that there is greater liberty in a large than in a strait prison; but one of those liberties is not more intense than the other, &c.

'Tis one thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, and another thing to say he hath the Power to do what he will. A man that is bound would say readily he hath not the liberty to walk, but he will not say he wants the power: but the sick man will say he wants the power to walk, but not the liberty. This is, as I conceive, to speak the English tongue; and consequently, an Englishman will not say,—the Liberty to do what he will, but the Power to do what he will is Omnipotence; therefore either I or the Bishop understand not English. Whereas he adds that I mistake the meaning of the words, liberty of specification, I am sure that in that way wherein I expound them, there is no absurdity: but if he say I understand not what the Schoolmen mean by them, I will not content with him, for I think they know not what they mean themselves.

"And here he falls into another invective against Distinctions and Scholastical Expressions, and the Doctors of the Church, who by this means tyrannized over the understanding of other men. What a presumption is this for one private man," &c.

That he may know I am no enemy to intelligible distinctions, I also will use a distinction in the defence of myself against this his accusation. I say therefore that some Distinctions are Scholastical only, and some are Scholastical and Sapiential also. Against those that are Scholastical only, I do and may inveigh; but against those that are Scholastical and Sapiential also, I do not inveigh. Likewise some Doctors of the Church, as Suarez, Johannes a Duns, and their imitators, to breed in men such opinions as the Church of Rome thought suitable to their interest, did write such things as neither other men nor themselves understood. These I confess I have a little slighted. Other Doctors of the Church, as Martin Luther, Philip Melanc-
thain, John Calvin, William Perkins, and others that did write
their sense clearly, I never slighted, but always very much re-
verenced and admired. Wherein then lieth my presumption? If
it be because I am a private man, let the Bishop also take
heed he contradict not some of those whom the world worthily
esteems; lest he also, for he is a private man, be taxed of pro-
sumption.

I confess that among the Logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii,
Ferio, &c. are Terms of Art. But if the Bishop think that
words of first and second intention, that abstract and concrete, that
subjects and predicates, moods and figures, method synthetic and ana-
lytic, fallacies of composition and division, be Terms of Art, I
am not of his opinion: for these are no more Terms of Art in
Logic than Lines, Figures, Squares, Triangles, &c. in the Mathe-
maties: Barbara, Celarent, and the rest that follow, are Terms
of Art invented for the easier apprehension of young men; and
are by young men understood. But the Terms of the School,
with which I have found fault, have been invented to blind
the understanding, and cannot be understood by those that in-
tend to learn Divinity. And to his question, whether the Mo-
ral Philosopher must quit his means and extremes, I answer, that
though they are not terms of Art, he ought to quit them when
they cannot be understood, and when they can, to use them
rightly. And therefore, though Means and Extremes be terms
intelligible, yet I would have them quit the placing of Virtue in
the one, and of Vice in the other. But for his liberty of contra-
diction and contrariety, his necessity absolute and hypothetical (if
any moral philosopher ever used them) then away with them;
they serve for nothing but to seduce young students. In like
manner, let the Natural Philosopher no more mention his inten-
tional species, his understanding agent and patient, his receptive
and eductive power of the matter, his qualities infusa or influxa, sym-
bola, or dissymbola, his temperament ad pondus and ad justitiam.
He may keep his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous; but his
SUPPLEMENT.

sympathies and antipathies, his antiperistasis, and the like, names of Excuses rather than of Causes, I would have him fling away. And for the Astrologer, (unless he means Astronomer) I would have him throw away his whole trade: but if he mean Astronomer, then the Terms of eqaeterum and perigeeum, arctic, antarctic, Equator, solstices, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones, are no more terms of Art in Astronomy, than a Saw or a Hatchet in the art of a carpenter. He cites no Terms of Art for Geometry; I was afraid he would have put Lines, or perhaps Equality, or Inequality for terms of art. So that now I know not what be those terms that he thinks I would cast away in Geometry. And lastly, for his Metaphysician, I would have him quit both his Terms and his Profession, as being in truth (as Plutarch saith in the beginning of the Life of Alexander the Great) not at all profitable to Learning, but made only for an essay to the Learner; and the Divine to use no word in preaching, but such as his Auditors, nor in writing, but such as a common reader may understand: and all this, not for the pleasing of my palate, but for the promotion of Truth.

"T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book de Cive, cap. 19.—that it is a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of Good and Evil belongs to private persons: and cap. 17, that in questions of Faith, the Civil magistrates ought to consult with the Ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God's blessing is derived by imposition of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary Truths, &c.—There he attributes too much to them, here he attributes too little: both there and here he takes too much upon him. The Spirits of the Prophets are subject to the Prophets."

He thinks he hath a great advantage against me from my own words in my book De Cive, which he would not have thought, if he had understood them.

The knowledge of Good and Evil is Judicature, which in Latin is Cognitio Causarum, not Scientia. Every private man may
do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and evil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in others belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power appointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting that cognosce is to judge, as Adam did of God's commandment, hath cited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the Ecclesiastical Doctors, by me attributed to them, it is not that they cannot be deceived, but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying them, when they are our lawfully constituted doctors. For the supreme Ecclesiastical Doctor is he that hath the supreme power; and in obeying him no subject can be deceived; because they are by God himself commanded to obey him. And what the Ecclesiastical Doctors lawfully constituted do tell us to be necessary in point of Religion, the same is told us by the sovereign power: and therefore, though we may be deceived by them in the belief of an opinion, we cannot be deceived by them in the duty of our actions: and this is all that I ascribe to the Ecclesiastical Doctors. If they think it too much, let them take upon them less; too little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, for a burden: and for them who seek it as a worldly prevenient, it is too much. I take, (he says) too much upon me. Why so? because "the spirits of the Prophets are subject to the Prophets." This is it that he finds fault with in me, when he says I am a private man, that is to say, no Prophet, that is to say, no Bishop: by which it is manifest that the Bishop subjecteth not his spirit but to the Convocation of Bishops. I admit that every man ought to subject his spirit to the Prophets; but a Prophet is he that speaketh unto us from God; which I acknowledge none to do but him that hath due authority so to do; and no man hath due authority so to do immediately, but he that hath the supreme authority of the Commonwealth; nor mediatelly, but they that speak such things to the people as he that hath the supreme authority alloweth of. And as it is truth in this sense, that the Spirits of the
Prophets are subject to the Prophets; so it is also true, that we ought not "to believe every Spirit, but to try the Spirits, whether they are of God: because many false Prophets are gone out into the World." 1 John, 4. 1. Therefore I, that am a private man, may examine the Prophets: which to do I have no other means but to examine whether their Doctrine be agreeable to the Law: which their is not, who divide the Commonwealth into two Commonwealths, Civil and Ecclesiastical. page 211 to 215.

"De veniam, Imperator; in carcerem, illis gubernatorem ministrum. Excuse me, O Emperor; thou threatenest me with prison, but God threateneth me with hell."

This sentence, and that which he saith Number 17, that neither the Civil Judge is the proper Judge, nor the Law of the Land the proper rule of Sin, and divers other sayings of his to the same effect, make it impossible for any nation in the world to preserve themselves from civil wars. For all men living, equally acknowledging that the high and omnipotent God is to be obeyed before the greatest Emperors, every one may pretend the Commandment of God to justify his disobedience. And if one man pretendeth that God commands one thing, and another man that he commands the contrary, what equity is there to allow the pretense of one more than of another? or what peace can there be, if they be all allowed alike? There will therefore necessarily arise discord and civil war, unless there be a Judge agreed upon, with authority given to him by every one of them, to shew them and interpret to them the word of God; which Interpreter is always the Emperor, King, or other Sovereign person, who therefore ought to be obeyed. But the Bishop thinks that to shew us, and interpret to us the word of God, belongeth to the Clergy; wherein I cannot consent unto him. Excuse me, O Bishop; you threaten me with that you cannot do; but the Emperor threateneth me with death, and is able to do what he threateneth, &c.
SUPPLEMENT.

It seems that he calleth Compulsion force; but I call it a fear of Force, or of damage to be done by force; by which fear a man's will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will before. Force taketh away the Sin, because the action is not his that is forced, but his that forceth. It is not always so in Compulsion; because in this case a man electeth the Less Evil, under the notion of Good. But his instances of the betrothed damsel that was forced, and of Tamar, may for any thing there appeareth in the text, be instances of Compulsion, and yet the Damsel and Tamar be both innocent. In that which immediately followeth, concerning how far Fear may extenuate a Sin, there is nothing to be answered. I perceive in it, he hath some glimmering of the Truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It is true, that just Fear dispenses not with the precepts of God or Nature; for they are not dispensable: but it extenuateth the fault, not by diminishing any thing in the action, but by being no transgression; for if the Fear be allowed, the Action it produceth is allowed also. Nor doth it dispense in any case with the Law positive, but by making the Action itself Lawful: for the breaking of a Law is always sin; and it is certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive precepts, though with the loss of their lives; unless the Right that a man hath to preserve himself make it, in case of a just Fear, to be no Law. page 229, 230.

As for the distinction itself (between actus imperatus and actus illicitus), because the terms are Latin, and never used by any author of the Latin tongue, to shew their impertinence, I expounded them in English, and left them to the reader's judgment to find the absurdity of them himself. And the Bishop, in this part of his reply endeavours to defend them: and first, he calls it a trivial and grammatical objection, to say they are Improper and Obscure. Is there any thing less befitting a Divine or a Philosopher, than to speak improperly and obscurely; where the Truth is in question? perhaps it may be tolerable in
one that Divineth, but not in him that pretendeth to Demon-
strate. It is not the universal current of Divines and Philoso-
phers that giveth words their authority, but the generality of
them who acknowledge that they understand them. Tvrros and
Presumere, though their signification be changed, yet they are
understood ; and so are the names of the days, Sunday, Monday,
Tuesday ; and when English readers, not engaged in School-
Divinity, shall find imperate and eticit acts as intelligible as
those, I will confess I had no reason to find fault. p. 235, 4.

"They who invented this term of actus imperatus understood
not (he saith) any thing that it signified.—No? Why not? It
seemeth to me, they understood it better than those who except
against it. They knew there are Mental terms, which are only
conceived in the mind, as well as Vocal terms, which are ex-
pressed with the tongue," &c.

In this place the Bishop hath discovered the ground of all his
errors in Philosophy ; which is this, that he thinketh, when he
repeateth the words of a proposition in his mind, that is, when he
fancieth the words, without speaking them, that then he conceiv-
eth the things which the words signify. And this is the most
general cause of false opinions : for men can never be deceived
in the Conception of things, though they may, and are most often
deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or appellations, dif-
ferent from those which are commonly used and constituted to
signify their Conceptions. And therefore they that study to at-
tain the certain knowledge of Truth, do use to set down before-
hand all the Terms they are to express themselves by, and de-
clare in what sense they shall use them constantly : and by this
means the reader, having an idea of every thing there named,
cannot conceive amiss. But when a man, from the hearing of a
word, hath no idea of the thing signified, but only of the sound,
and of the letters whereof the word is made, (which is that he
here calleth Mental Terms) it is impossible he should conceive
right, or bring forth any thing but absurdity; as he doth here.
when he says that when Tarquin delivered his commands to his son, by only striking off the tops of the poppies, he did it by Mental terms: as if to strike off the head of a poppy were a mental term. page 235.

The Bishop speaks often of Paradoxes with such scorn or detestation, that a simple reader would take a Paradox either for Folly or some other heinous crime, or else for some ridiculous turpitude: whereas perhaps the judicious reader knows what the word signifies; and that a Paradox is an Opinion not yet generally received. Christian Religion was once a Paradox; and a great many other opinions which the Bishop now holdeth were formerly Paradoxes: insomuch as when a man calleth an opinion Paradox, he doth not say it is untrue, but signifies his own ignorance: for if he understood it, he would call it either a Truth or an Error. He observes not that, but for Paradoxes, we should be now in that savage ignorance which those men are in that have not, or have not long had Laws and Commonwealth; from whence proceedeth Science and Civility. page 239.

"My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner."

To this I answered, that it was true: and as he alleged it for a reason why he should not be of my opinion, so I alleged it for a reason why I should not be of his. But now in his reply he saith,—that his opinion is a truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world: and therefore though he be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how this Liberty of Will consists with God's eternal Prescience and Decrees, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest.—But why should he adhere to it, unless it be manifest to himself? and if it be manifest to himself, why does he deny that he is able to comprehend it? and if he be not able to comprehend it, how knows he that it is demonstrable? or why says he that so confidently, which he does not know? Methinks that
which I have said—namely, that that which God foreknows shall be hereafter, cannot but be hereafter, and at the same time that he foreknew it should be: but that which can not but be is necessary: therefore what God foreknows, shall be necessarily, and at the time foreknown,—this, I say, looketh somewhat liker to a demonstration than any thing that he hath hitherto brought to prove Free-Will. Another reason why I should be of his opinion is—that he is in possession of an old Truth derived to him by inheritance or succession from his Ancestors.—To which I answer, first, that I am in possession of a Truth derived to me from the light of Reason. Secondly, that whereas he knoweth not whether it be the Truth that he possesses or not, because he confesseth he knows not how it can consist with God's prescience and decrees, I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of Necessity not only agrees with, but necessarily followeth from the eternal Prescience and Decrees of God. Besides it is an unhandsome thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning Truth by succession from his Ancestors: for our Ancestors the first Christians derived not therefore their truth from the Gentiles, because they were their Ancestors.

page 262.

"He saith moreover, that he understands as little how it can be true which I say, that God is not just, but Justice itself, not eternal, but Eternity itself. It seems, howsoever he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his head overmuch with reading School-divines or Metaphysicians."

They are unseemly words to be said of God, (I will not say blasphemous and atheistical, which are the attributes he gives to my opinions, because I do not think them spoken out of an evil mind, but out of Error) they are, I say, unseemly words to be said of God, that he is not just, that he is not eternal, and, as he also said, that he is not wise; and cannot be excused by any following but, especially when the but is followed by that which is not to be understood. Can any man understand how Justice is just, or Wisdom wise? and whereas Justice is an
accident, one of the moral virtues, and Wisdom another, how God is an accident or moral virtue? 'Tis more than the Schoolmen or Metaphysicians can understand: whose writings have troubled my head more than they should have done, if I had known that among so many senseless disputes there had been so few lucid intervals. But I have considered since, where men will undertake to reason out of Natural Philosophy of the incomprehensible nature of God, that it is impossible they should speak intelligibly, or in other language than Metaphysic; wherein they may contradict themselves, and not perceive it; as he does here, when he says—the Attributes of God are not diverse virtues or qualities in him, as they are in the creatures; but really one and the same with the divine essence, and among themselves; and attributed to God to supply the defect of our Capacity.—Attributes are names; and therefore it is a contradiction to say they are really one and the same with the divine Essence. But if he mean the Virtues signified by the Attributes, as, Justice, Wisdom, Eternity, Divinity, &c. so also they are Virtues, and not one Virtue; which is still a contradiction: and we give those attributes to God, not to shew that we apprehend how they are in him, but to signify how we think it best to honour him. page 268.

"If I did not know what Deliberation was, I should be little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes it to be a consideration, or an act of the understanding, sometimes an imagination, or an act of the fancy, &c. So he makes it I know not what."

If the Bishop had observed what he does himself, when he deliberates, reasons, understands, or imagines, he would have known what to make of all that I have said in this number. He would have known that Consideration, Understanding, Reason, and all the passions of the mind, are Imagination: that to consider a thing is to imagine it; that to understand a thing is to imagine it; that to hope and fear are to imagine the things hoped
for and feared. The difference between them is, that when we imagine the Consequence of any thing, we are said to consider that thing; and when we have imagined any thing from a sign, and especially from those signs we call Names, we are said to understand his meaning that maketh the sign; and when we reason, we imagine the Consequence of affirmations and negations joined together; and when we hope or fear, we imagine things good or hurtful to ourselves; insomuch, as all these are but imaginations, diversely named from different circumstances, as any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his own thoughts. But to him that thinketh not himself upon the things whereof, but upon the words wherewith he speaketh, and taketh these words on trust from puzzled Schoolmen, it is not only hard, but impossible to be known; and this is the reason that maketh him say—I make Deliberation he knows not what. But how is Deliberation defined by him. It is, saith he, “an inquiry made by Reason, whether this or that definitely considered be a good and fit means; or indefinitely, what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining some wished end.”—If it were not his custom to say, the Understanding understandeth, the Will willeth, and so of the rest of the faculties, I should have believed that when he says, Deliberation is an inquiry made by Reason, he meaneth an inquiry made by the man that reasoneth; for so it will be sense: but the Reason which a man useth in deliberation being the same thing that is called Deliberation, his definition, that Deliberation is an inquiry made by Reason, is no more than if he had said, Deliberation is an inquiry made by Deliberation; a definition good enough to be made by a Schoolman. Nor is the rest of the definition altogether as it should be: for there is no such thing as “an indefinite consideration of what are good and fit means;” but a man imagining first one thing, then another, considereth them successively and singly each one, whether it conduceth to his ends or not. page 278.

“How that should be a right definition of Liberty, which
comprehends neither the Genus nor the Difference, neither the Matter nor the Form of Liberty, &c.—How a real faculty, or the elective power, should be defined by a negation, or by an absence, is past my understanding, and contrary to all the rules of right reason which I have learned."

A right Definition is that which determineth the signification of the word defined; to the end that in the discourse where it is used the meaning of it may be constant and without equivocation. This is the measure of a Definition, and intelligible to an English reader. But the Bishop, that measures it by the Genus and the Difference, thinks (it seems) though he write English, he writes not to an English reader, unless he be also a Schoolman. I confess the rule is good, that we ought to define, (when it can be done) by using first some more general term and then by restraining the signification of that general term, till it be the same with that of the word defined: and this general term the School calls genus, and the restraint difference. This I say is a good rule, where it can be done; for some words are so general that they cannot admit a more general in their definition; but why this ought to be a Law of Definition, I doubt it would trouble him to find the reason; and therefore I refer him (he shall give me leave sometimes to cite, as well as he) to the 14 and 15 articles of the 6 chap. of my book De Corpore. But it is to little purpose that he requires in a Definition so exactly the genus and the difference, seeing he does not know them when they are there: for in this my Definition of Liberty, the Genus is absence of impediments to action; and the difference or restriction is, that they be not contained in the nature of the agent.

page 287.

"A cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it produce that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man; or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as in the generation of a monster: the former is properly called a sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause."
SUPPLEMENT.

In these few lines he hath said,—the cause of the generation of
a monster is sufficient to produce a monster, and that it is insuffi-
cient to produce a monster. How soon a man may forget his
words, that deth not understand them! This term of insufficient
Cause (which also the School calls deficient, that they may rime to
efficient) is not intelligible; but a word devised like Hocus Po-
cus, to juggle a difficulty out of sight. That which is sufficient
to produce a Monster, is not therefore to be called an insuffi-
cient cause to produce a Man; no more than that which is suffi-
cient to produce a Man, is to be called an insufficient Cause to
produce a Monster. page 297.4

"His reason—that matter of fact is not verified by other men's
arguments, but by every man's own sense and memory,—is
likewise maimed on both sides. Whether we hear such words
or not is matter of fact; and Sense is the proper judge of it:
but what these words do or ought truly to signify, is not to be
judged by Sense, but by Reason."

A man is born with a capacity, after due time and experience,
to reason truly: to which Capacity of nature if there be added
no discipline at all, yet as far as he reasoneth he will reason
truly; though by a right discipline he may reason truly in more
numerous and various matters. But he that hath lighted on
decoying or deceived masters, that teach for Truth all that hath
been dictated to them by their own interest, or hath been cried
up by other such teachers before them, have for the most part
their natural reason, as far as concerneth the truth of Doctrine,
quite defaced or very much weakened; becoming changelings
through the enchantment of words not understood. This cometh
into my mind from this saying of the Bishop—that matter of fact
is not verified by sense and memory, but by arguments.—How
is it possible that without discipline a man should come to think
that the testimony of a witness, which is the only verifier of mat-
ter of fact, should consist, not in sense and memory, (so as he
may say he saw and remembers the thing done) but in argu-
ments or syllogisms? or how can an unlearned man be brought to think the words he speaks ought to signify (when he speaks sincerely) any thing else but that which himself meant by them? or how can any man without learning take the question—whether the Sun be no bigger than a ball, or bigger than the Earth—to be a question of fact? Nor do I think that any man is so simple as not to find that to be good which he loveth; good I say, so far forth as it maketh him to love it: or is there any unlearned man so stupid as to think Eternity is this present instant of time standing still, and the same Eternity to be the very next instant after; and consequently that there be so many Eternities as there can be instants of time supposed? No: there is Scholastic learning required in some measure to make one mad.

page 308.

"For the actions of brute beasts, &c. to think each animal motion of theirs is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity, I see no ground for it."

It maketh nothing against the Truth, that he sees no ground for it. I have pointed out the ground in my former discourse, and am not bound to find him eyes. He himself immediately citeth a place of Scripture that proveth it, where Christ saith,—one of those sparrows doth not fall to the ground, without your heavenly father:—which place, if there were no more, were a sufficient ground for the assertion of the necessity of all those changes of animal motion: in birds and other living creatures, which seem to us so uncertain. But when a man is dizzy with influence of power, illicit acts, presuming will, hypothetical necessity, and the like unintelligible terms, the ground goes from him. By and by, he confesseth that "many things are called contingent in respect of us, because we know not the cause of them, which really and in themselves are not contingent, but necessary," and err therein the other way: for he says in effect that many things are, which are not; for it is all one to say—they are not contingent—and, they are not.
SUPPLEMENT.

He should have said, there be many things, the necessity of whose contingency we cannot or do not know. page 323.

"Solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them (men of wit and learning) than upon weaker judgments. The more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it."

I confess the more solid a man's wit is, the better will solid reasons work upon him. But if he add to it that which he calls Learning, that is to say, much reading of other men's doctrines, without weighing them with his own thoughts, then their judgments become weaker, and the balance less exact. And whereas he saith, that they whose God is true are not afraid to have it tried by the touch, he speaketh as if I had been afraid to have my doctrine tried by the touch of men of wit and learning; wherein he is not much mistaken, meaning by men of learning, (as I said before) such as had read other men, but not themselves. For by reading others, men commonly obstruct the way to their own exact and natural judgment; and use their wit both to deceive themselves with Fallacies, and to requite those who endeavour, at their own entreaty, to instruct them, with revilings.

"If we be in an error, it is such an error as is sucked from Nature; as is confirmed by Reason, by Experience, and by Scripture; as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered; an error wherein we have the concurrence of all the best Philosophers; an error that bringeth to God the glory of Justice, &c.; that renders men more devout, more pious, more humble, more industrious, more penitent for their sins."

All this is but said: and what heretofore hath been offered in proof of it, hath been sufficiently refuted, and the contrary proved; namely, that it is an error contrary to the nature of the Will,—repugnant to Reason and Experience,—repugnant to the Scripture,—repugnant to the doctrine of St. Paul (and 'tis pity that the Fathers and Doctors
of the Church have not followed St. Paul there Science)—an error not maintained by the best Philosophers, (for they are not the best Philosophers which the Bishop thinketh so) an error that taketh from God the glory of his Presence, nor bringeth to him the glory of his other attributes,—an error that maketh men, by imagining they can repent when they will, neglect their duties;—and that maketh men unthankful for God's graces, by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability of their own will. page 338, 9.

ON DELIBERATION.

Leviathan, chap. 6.

When in the mind of man Appetites and Aversions, Hopes and Fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil Consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes, and Fears, continued till the thing be either done or thought impossible, is that we call Deliberation.

Therefore of things past there is no Deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know or think such Deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate, not knowing it is in vain. And it is called Deliberation, because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing or omitting, according to our own appetite or aversion.

This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes, and fears, is no less in other living creatures than in man; and therefore Beasts also deliberate.
Every deliberation is then said to end, when that whereof they deliberate is either done or thought impossible: because till then we retain the liberty of doing or omitting, according to our appetite or aversion.

In Deliberation the last Appetite or Aversion immediately adhering to the Action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the Will,—the act, not the faculty, of Willing. And Beasts that have deliberation, must necessarily also have Will. The definition of the Will given commonly by the Schools, that it is a rational appetite, is not good: for if it were, then there could be no voluntary act against Reason: for a voluntary act is that which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if instead of a Rational Appetite we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that I have given here.

Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating: and though we say in common discourse,—a man had a will once to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do,—yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no action voluntary; because the Action depends not on it, but on the last inclination or appetite. For if the intervenient appetites make any action voluntary, then, by the same reason, all intervenient aversions should make the same action involuntary: and so, one and the same Action should be both voluntary and involuntary.

By this it is manifest that not only actions that have their beginning from covetousness, ambition, or other appetites to the thing propounded, but also those that have their beginning from aversion, or fear of those consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary actions.
LIBERTY CONSISTENT WITH FEAR AND WITH NECESSITY.

Leviathan, chap. 21.

Liberty or Freedom signifieth properly the Absence of opposition; (by Opposition I mean external impediments of motion;) and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied or environed as it cannot move but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned or restrained by walls or chains, and of the water, whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels, that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say— they are not at liberty to move in such manner as without those external impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion is in the Constitution of the thing itself, we use not to say—it wants the Liberty, but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.

And according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a Freeman is he, that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a Will to. But when the words free and liberty are applied to anything but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion is not subject to impediment: and therefore when 'tis said, (for example) the Way is free, no Liberty of the Way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop: and when we say a Gift is free, there is not meant any Liberty of the Gift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law or covenant to give it. So when we speak freely, it is not the Liberty of Voice or Pronunciation, but of the man, whom no Law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did.
Lastly, from the use of the word free-will, no Liberty can be inferred of the Will, Desire, or Inclination, but the Liberty of the Man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.

Fear and Liberty are consistent: as when a man throweth his goods into the sea, for fear the ship should sink; he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will: it is therefore the action of one that was free. So a man sometimes pays his debt only for fear of imprisonment; which because nobody hindered him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. And generally all actions which men do in commonwealths for fear of the Law, are actions which the doers had liberty to omit.

Liberty and Necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do; which, because they proceed from their Will, proceed from Liberty; and yet, because every act of man's Will, and every desire and inclination, proceedeth from some Cause, and that from another Cause, in a continual chain, (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those Causes, the Necessity of all men's voluntary actions would appear manifest: and therefore God, that seeth and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of Man, in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, and no more nor less. For though men may do many things which God does not command, nor is therefore author of them, yet they can have no Passion, nor Appetite to any thing, of which Appetite God's Will is not the Cause. And did not his Will assure the Necessity of man's will, and consequently of all that on man's will dependeth, the Liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the Omnipotence and Liberty of God.